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I. INTRODUCTION
T his Article is about the military contractor defense-the legal doc-
trine which insulates weapons makers from liability to servicemen
for injuries caused by defectively designed weapons. The military con-
tractor defense is currently before the Supreme Court., In resolving this
issue which has occupied so much attention in the lower courts,2 the
I Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 872 (1987).
2 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL NO. 381, (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1987); Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. CL 872
(1987); Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403
(4th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster
at Mannhein, Germany on Sept. 11, 1982,769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067
(1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821
(1985); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I.
Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656 (3d
Cir. 1984) (Brown 1); In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982)
(Brown ); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984); Vasing v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981); Challoner v. Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), vacated on othergrounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Foster
v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 592 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974); Whitaker Y. Harvell-Kilgore Corp.,
418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961);
Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984 (D. Md. 1987); Church v. Martin-
Baker Aircraft Co., 643 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp.,
626 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re General
Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 602 F. Supp. 497 (D. Conn. 1984); In re All Maine Asbestos
Litigation, 575 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Me. 1983); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D.
Kan. 1983); Plas v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. C-78-946 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 1983);
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Supreme Court will add its unique perspective to the national debate on
issues of accountability for military policy. This Article suggests that the
military contractor defense raises critical issues of law which need to be
carefully addressed.
How should the United States make weapons, by whom, and under
what authority? The United States entrusts a private weapons industry
to equip its supreme military force, necessitated by the realities of
modern geopolitics. What is the legal relationship between the military
and its suppliers? What is the proper role for the legal system? For a
constitutional democracy to sustain the status of world superpower
presents difficult problems regarding the propriety of judicial scrutiny of
issues potentially impacting on weapons procurement. These questions
are as old as the Republic although the technological leap since 1945 has
altered the nature of the debate.
The military contractor defense has generated a considerable quantity
of academic discussion.3 This Article does not intend to review that
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States, No. 79-0382 (D. Haw. Oct. 20, 1983); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1417 (1984); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Jenkins
v. Whittaker Corp., 551 F. Supp. 10 (D. Haw. 1982); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States,
243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965); Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 55624 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. May 24, 1982); Valeri v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 82-2686, (D. N.J. Dec. 11,
1985); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), affd, 154 N.J. Super.
407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
3 See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TiAL MASS Toxic DisAsrEns iN THE CousiT
(1986); Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products
Liability, 47 Omo ST. L. J. 985 (1986); Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the
Weapons of War, 29 ST. Loins U.L.J. 383 (1985); Chapman, Government Contractor Defense
Revisited, TRtAL LAw. GuIDE 30 (1986); Geldon, New Developments in Government Contract
Litigation, 32 PRAc. LAw 67 (1986); Polinky, Product Liability and the United States
Government Contractor, 14 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 313 (1984); Scantlebury, The Government
Contract Defense: Alive and Well in the Fourth Circuit, 22 Tonr & INs. L.J. 268 (1987);
Sherman, Agent Orange and Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52 BRooKLi L. REv.
369 (1986); Tobak, A Case of Mistaken Liability: The Government Contractor's Liability for
Injuries Incurred by Members of the Armed Forces, 13 PuB. CONT. L. J. 74 (1982); Turner and
Sutin, The Government ContractorDefense: When are Manufacturers of Military Equipment
Shielded From Liability For Design Defects?, 52 J. Am L. & CoM. 397 (1986); Twerski, With
Liberty and Justice For All: An Essay on Agent Orange and Choice of Law, 52 BRooKLYN L.
REV. 341 (1986); Zollers, Rethinking the Government Contract Defense, 24 Aie. Bus. L. J. 405
(1986); Note, The Government Contract Defense: Is Sovereign Immunity A Necessary
Prerequisite?, 52 BROOxLyN L. REv. 495 (1986); Note, In Defense of the Government
Contractor Defense, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 219 (1986); Note, The Essence of the Agent Orange
Litigation: The Governmental Contractor Defense, 12 HoFssnA L. REv. 983 (1984); Note, The
Government Contractor Defense and Manufacturers ofMilitaryEquipment, 21 Hous. L. REv.
855 (1984); Note, Government Contractor Defense to StrictProducts Liaiblity, 49 J. Am. L. &
Com. 671 (1984); Note, The Government Contract Defense: Should Manufacturer Discretion
Preclude Its Availability?, 37 ME. L. REv. 187 (1985); Note, Tort Remedies For Servicemen
Injured by Military Equipment: A Case for Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 601
(1980); Note, The Government Contractor Defense. Preserving the Government's Discretion-
1987]
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discussion; instead, it uses the controversy over the military contractor
defense to focus on an abstract, but critically important issue of law: Will
weapons manufacturers be recognized as framers of national security
policy such that they are entitled to legal status and immunities
equivalent to those of the military itself? If the answer to that question is
"yes," then in this year of the Constitution's bicentennial, we have indeed
sold our birthright to the military/industrial complex.
The courts which have propounded the military contractor defense
have cited the need for a close and unscrutinized relationship between the
military and weapons makers. This holding, in addition to depriving
accident victims of compensation which they would otherwise receive
under state tort law, fundamentally misconstrues the weapons procure-
ment process. Exposure of this misconstruction is the purpose of this
Article.
It has been asserted that "the judiciary should not be thrust into the
position of second-guessing military decisions.... [Ilnterference by civil-
ian courts with military authority raises both questions about judicial
competency in this area and separation of powers" 4--it is "unseemly that
a democracy's most serious decisions, those providing for common sur-
vival and defense, be made by its least accountable branch of govern-
ment."5 The heart of the military contractor defense is the proposition
that the judiciary cannot and should not decide whether the manufac-
turer or the military was responsible for the defect because "there can be
no question that the design of military equipment is, at bottom, a
military decision."6 Curiously, these propositions are advanced without
serious inquiry as to their veracity. Yet, federal appellate courts have
cited these assertions to strike down jury verdicts awarded under state
product liability law. It is important to emphasize that the military
contractor defense is a judicially-developed policy which operates to deny
remedies which would otherwise be available by law. Regardless of the
ary Design Decisions--McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 57 TeMP. L.Q. 697 (1984);
Note, Schoenborn v. Boeing Co.: The Government Contractor Defense Becomes a Windfall'
for Military Contractors, 40 U. Mwu L. REv. 287 (1985); Note, Under a Cloak of Olive Drab:
Extending the Military Contractor Defense in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 48 U. Pnrr. L. REV. 933
(1987); Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96
YALE L. J. 1077 (1987); Comment, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective
Cloak of Sovereign Immunity After McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYhos L.
REv. 181 (1985); Comment, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by
the Government, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1025 (1982); Comment, The Government Contract Defense:
An Overview, 27 How. L.J. 275 (1984); Comment, An Interpretation of the Peres Doctrine
After West v. United States and In re 'Agent Orange' Product Liability Litigation, 70 IowA L.
REv. 757 (1985); Comment, Strict Product Liability Suits for Design Defects in Military
Products: All the King's Men; All the King's Privileges?, 10 U. DAYFON L. Rev. 117 (1984).
4 Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574-75 (5th Cir. 1985).
s Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
Bynum, 770 F.2d at 569.
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merits of the military contractor defense as policy, there is a serious
question raised as to the limits of authority of the federal appellate courts
to interfere with the operation of state tort law.
Essentially, the military contractor defense shields weapons makers
from state product liability law because of fears that operation of that law
will cause the judiciary to trespass into the military sphere. Difficult
issues revolve around the relationship between the judiciary and the
military. Platitudes are easy-homilies of the dire consequences of one
institution trespassing onto the other's sphere do not help answer these
issues. The doctrine of separation of powers does not hermetically
insulate one branch of government from another. "Separation of powers
analysis must focus pragmatically on whether the challenged provision
actually or potentially interferes with the ability of the affected branch to
accomplish its constitutionally assigned functions. " 7 It is necessary,
therefore, to investigate the extent to which matters of military strategy
and procurement may be legally addressable.
This Article suggests that the military contractor defense constitutes a
rejection of the judicial role in regulating procurement. This rejection is
an unwarranted step in favor of an overgrown military establishment.
Court decisions have suggested that the design of a weapon is pre-
sumably a policy decision unreviewable in the courts. In fact, a scrutiny
of procurement policy shows that the military of the United States has
clearly chosen a private market weapons industry with its accumbent
advantages and disadvantages in order that that market system,
regulated by commercial law, would produce more and better weapons at
lower cost. This policy provides that determinations be made assigning
responsibility for the design of a weapons system, and these determina-
tions are judicially reviewable. There is little in the process of de-
termining responsibility which in any way implicates the formation or
execution of military policy. To the extent that the military contractor
defense rests on the proposition that the design of a weapons system is
the result of a blurred meshing of manufacturing capabilities with
national security needs, the defense denies the efforts of the Department
of Defense and the Congress to develop a procurement system embodying
strict standards of accountability. The judiciary has a vital role in
enforcing that accountability which should not be abdicated.
The theme of this Article is that military policy is something which is
factually, theoretically, and legally separate from weapons manufacture.
The line of demarcation which separates the military as the protector of
national security from the weapons maker as the manufacturer of goods
must be judicially understood and underscored; since weapons makers
may not decide American military policy, they should not be entitled to
7 Ameron, Ine. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 881 (3d Cir. 1986).
1987]
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the legal deference afforded the military itself. In a democracy, there
should be resistance to the possibility that weapons makers are inti-
mately involved in establishing this nation's military policy.8 There
exists some historical apprehension that, if empowered, private weapons
makers might initiate and propel military acquisitions in order to
advance their pecuniary interests. 9 If it were true, it would be a grievous
fault. True or false, it is a possibility which must not receive judicial
imprimatur. On the contrary, weapons makers must be held legally
accountable to the same degree as any private market participant.
Judicial deference is appropriate only for controversies demonstrably
falling into the sphere of policy-making.
While the necessity of a private weapons industry has long been
undeniable,10 that necessity is not a justification for denying the respon-
sibility of these manufacturers to be held accountable for the weaponry
they produce. Congress and the Executive have demonstrated a commit-
ment to a regulated system of procurement which segregates strategic
and policy responsibilities from undue influence by the private economic
interests that supply weapons for profit. The weapons industry is not part
of the military; its members have no unique responsibility to fashion
policy or to make strategic decisions. As the last forty years have
witnessed the growth of the most powerful military establishment
assembled by humankind, there has been the corresponding onus to use
that power in the pursuit of policy democratically decided. Military
strength has been sought, but not militarism. A private source of
weapons production has developed, but privatization of weapons policy is
eschewed.
This Article puts forward the counter-proposition that primary respon-
sibility for the design of most weapons systems, in fact, lies with the
contractor. Consider the recent testimony of Brig. Gen. Weiss before the
Senate Armed Services Committee:
Ultimate responsibility for product quality and the assurance
that a given company's product conforms to contractual specifi-
cations and the statements of work, rest with the prime contrac-
8 President Washington warned: "Overgrown military establishments are, under any
form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile
to republican liberty." E. MEAn, WASHmGTON, JEFERSON AND FRANxLIN ON WAR 10 (1913).
These sentiments were, of course, echoed by President Eisenhower in his famous Farewell
Address to the American People, Jan. 17, 1961, reprinted in 44 D'VT OF STATE BULL. 179-82
(1961): "('1n the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.
The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."
9 See S. REP. No. 944, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1936).
'0 See To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1916).
[Vol. 35:351
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tor. The government's role is to assure that the contractor's
quality system is working and is reliable through periodic system
checks, audits and selected physical inspection of products on a
preplanned and random basis.
The cornerstone of our quality program is the military specifi-
cation, MIL-Q-9858A, Quality Program Requirements.... The
specification emphasizes the importance of contractor actions to
establish a timely method of preventing, detecting and correcting
discrepancies at the earliest possible time.
[T]he contractor is responsible for the quality of his product.
His responsibility starts with product design, carries through
producibility reviews and culminates in the manufacturing pro-
cess. The government's responsibility is to make sure that the
contractor's system is functioning through system checks, and
random and selected mandatory inspections and tests of prod-
uct."
Throughout this Article runs the underlying idea that the private
enterprise system of weapons procurement in the United States has
afforded large opportunities for personal and economic success in order to
provide incentives for efficient and innovative production.12 In 1985, the
Department of Defense placed contracts worth approximately $164
billion, seventy percent of which went to the top one hundred contrac-
tors. 13 The beneficiaries now claiming the military contractor defense
seek to have it both ways: the pecuniary benefits of the free market with
the legal privileges of being part of the military establishment. This
claim confuses military contractors with the duly authorized decision-
makers in the Department of Defense and the White House. If commer-
cial interests are immune from accountability under law because of the
judiciary's misconception that weapons makers can and should guide
military policy, then democratic control over the most critical matters of
national governance is jeopardized.
This Article contains two Parts. Part One presents the military contrac-
'" Task Force on Selected Defense Procurement Matters: Hearings Before the Senate
Armed Services Committee 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12 (1984) (statement of Brig. Gen.
Bernard L. Weiss, Director Contracting and Manufacturing Policy, Headquarters, United
States Air Force).
2 The Department of Defense is the largest single purchaser of goods and services in the
nation. Each year it enters into 15 million contracts, about 52,000 per day. The Department
of Defense annually conducts business with some 60,000 prime contractors and hundreds of
thousands of other suppliers and subcontractors. Korb, The Defense Budget, in AMISCAN
DEMNSE. ANAL 1986-1987, at 41 (1986).
13 PRssmmENs BLUE RIBBON ConI. ON DEawNss MANAGEmENT, CoNDucT AN AccouNTA~un
1 (Comm. Print 1986).
1987]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tor defense in its current doctrinal form and concludes that the military
contractor defense can rest only upon a judicial refusal in the name of
separation of powers to scrutinize the responsibility for a weapon's
design. Part Two examines the United States' procurement system and
concludes that determinations of responsibility and accountability sub-
ject to judicial review are critical to the nation's reliance on the private
market for weapons.
I. PART ONE: UNDERSTANDING THE MIUTARY CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. Establishing the Prima Facie Case
1. The Accident
The following allegations are increasingly the subject of federal litiga-
tion: a serviceman died or was injured when the equipment s/he was
using malfunctioned (typically the pilot of an aircraft died in a crash).
None of these suits concern combat injuries--in every case the accident
occurred in training or testing. In many cases, neither the victim nor the
equipment is ever found.
A subsequent military investigation determines that an equipment
defect, rather than user or maintenance error, was the cause of the
accident. Survivors, if any, and witnesses are interviewed, logbooks and
records are examined, and simulated tests of various possible breakdowns
are performed. Most important in some cases may be a process of
elimination whereby possibly reasonable causes may be tested and
rejected, leaving only one potential cause. Based on all of the information
gathered in the investigation, an Official Report of Investigation is
prepared. In most of the cases discussed herein, the Report pointed to
equipment failure as the cause of the accident.
The injured serviceman or a representative of his estate then files suit
against the corporation which designed and manufactured the weapon in
question. Unfortunately, such suits have become more frequent in recent
years. Typically, the plaintiff tries to show that the manufacturer should
have designed the weapon in a manner which would have avoided the
accident or that it should have warned of the risk. Claims of negligence-
that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care in designing the weapon
so that it was reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was intended-
are often made. In every case, a claim of strict liability is made, alleging
that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user at the time of sale. 14 In fact, claims of negligence and strict
liability in servicemen suits alleging defectively designed weapons are
14 REsTATrEu'r (SEcoN) oF TowRs § 402A (1965).
[Vol. 35:351
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss3/4
LIABILITY OF WEAPONS MAKERS
very similar: in regard to each claim, the plaintiff must prove that design
of the weapon was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control
of the defendant/manufacturer and that that design defect caused the
injury.'5 Somewhat distinct but related is a claim that the manufacturer
knew of risks associated with its product and failed to warn the military
of those risks. In such event, the burden of showing an unreasonably
dangerous design is lessened if it is factually demonstrable that whatever
danger was threatened by the design was kept secret from the military.
Proving a defect need not be done by direct or conclusive evidence. The
accident itself is evidence of a defect, especially if other rational expla-
nations are eliminated. Thus, where hand grenades prematurely explode,
the liability of the manufacturer has gone to the jury even without direct
evidence of a defect.' 6 There is an obvious yet important point which is
asserted in these decisions: weapons are inherently lethal. Like good
whiskey,17 weapons are not unreasonably dangerous simply because they
are destructively employed. Mere danger or potential for harm does not
translate into unreasonable danger unless the danger is unanticipated by
the user. A hand grenade is not unreasonably dangerous because it
explodes; it is unreasonably dangerous when it explodes prematurely.
A contention has often been raised in strict liability litigation involv-
ing weapons that the design is state of the art at the cutting edge of
technology. Strict liability law has long recognized that the standard of
unreasonably dangerous must consider the risks inherent in forging new
capabilities. The obvious need for constant innovation in the production
of weapons means that the existence of a risk of accident does not render
the product in violation of that standard. However, just because a piece of
equipment is a weapon does not necessarily mean that it is on the cutting
edge of technology, nor does it mean that the particular device that was
defective was itself innovative. This is a question of fact, considerably
significant to the resolution of the dispute because the legal standard-
unreasonably dangerous in the context for which it was made and to be
used-must consider the military's acceptance of the risks of innovation
only when, in fact, it was innovative technology that caused the accident.
Only in one of the many recent disputes (Agent Orange) has a serious
factual issue been raised that the defect which caused the accident was
itself on the cutting edge of technology. Merely because the defect was in
a weapon has not suggested in most cases any reason for relaxing strict
liability law.
The most important question facing the finder of fact is proximate
cause. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defect caused his
, L. FRMER & M. FlIEDMAN, PRODUCen LIABILWL' § 3.03[4] [f] [iv] (1960).
1 Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 592 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
17 See REsTATENENT (SECOND) OF Tomvs § 402(a) comment i (1965).
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injury. The law permits a causal link to a design defect to be found when
injury follows either from a technical flaw in the design or from the
failure of the design to provide for safety or redundancy in the event of an
accident. The manufacturer is not an insurer against all accidents, but it
must produce weaponry designed to state of the art specifications in light
of its expertise and the weapon's intended use. Even where the military
is accused of having made faulty repairs on the weapon, thus interjecting
an unforeseeable and intervening negligent act, liability may be imposed
on the manufacturer where such military negligence is slight.18 By the
same logic, the manufacturer is not excused from liability by arguing
that it had merely assembled parts from its suppliers-the assembler of
components defectively produced by other manufacturers is subject to
liability as though it was the manufacturer of the component. 19 Cer-
tainly, the failure of a manufacturer carefully to inspect the final product
may be the proximate cause of the accident if a reasonable inspection
would have disclosed the defect.20
2. Legal Responsibility for the Design Defect
Assuming that the cause in fact of a serviceman's injury was a design
defect, the question remains as to who is responsible for that defect. Often
this responsibility is addressed contractually-the procurement contract
provides that responsibility for design rests with the manufacturer. Such
contractual provisions only address the mutual obligations of the manu-
facturer and the military without determining the tort liability of the
manufacturer to the injured serviceman. In tort actions, the injured
plaintiff still must prove that the defendant/manufacturer breached its
legal responsibility. This burden may be complicated by the unique
nature of military procurement.
Initially, the manufacturer may argue that the military stood between
it and the serviceman and thereby intervened in the chain of causation
such that the manufacturer was not responsible for the accident. The
manufacturer may argue that while the design was its own, it had to
submit the final design decision to the military for approval and review.
Furthermore, once submitted, the design may have been incorrectly or
negligently used or maintained and this improper use by the military
intervened as a cause of the accident. Thus, a recurring question has
involved the liability of a manufacturer for a design defect where the
government has inspected the weapon at the government's own facilities.
s Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981).
9 Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1969).
20 Guarnieri v. Kewanee Ross Corp., 263 F.2d 413 (2d Cir.) modified 270 F.2d 575 (2d
Cir. 1959); Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 149 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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The courts have repeatedly held that government negligence in inspect-
ing a weapon will not relieve the manufacturer of liability for a design
defect since the inspection is generally intended only to assure perfor-
mance of the work and not to create a duty of care on the military's part.2 1
Certainly, where the manufacturer introduces a flaw in the equipment
and where the cause of the accident can be factually traced to that flaw
which rendered the design unreasonably dangerous, then a prima facie
case against the manufacturer can generally be made. The difficult
problem appearing in many of the recent disputes concerns design defects
of omission--claims that while the accident was not in fact caused by a
design defect, the design was defective for failing to provide a means of
protecting against such contingencies or in building in redundancy such
that if one aspect of the equipment fails it is not catastrophic. This is the
crux of two cases which frame both sides of the current litigation: Tozer
v. LTV Corp.22 and Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.23
Failure to design defensively against foreseeable accidents may be
grounds for imposing strict liability. Even under strict liability, however,
not all accidents are foreseeable. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
some accidents are so foreseeable (indeed, they have happened before)
that it may be presumed that the buyer has assumed the risk. The point
here is that even where an aspect of the design is unreasonably dangerous
and where that aspect (defect) causes injury, a prima facie case under
strict liability may be made only against the party who had a legal duty
to act in such a way as to prevent the accident. The finder of fact must
determine, therefore, whether the military or the private manufacturer
bears responsibility for the absence of redundancy in the design of a
weapon that was thereby rendered unreasonably dangerous. In the
context of weapons procurement, where the equipment inevitably passes
through the unique hands of the military, the failure to include redun-
dant safety devices may not be a manufacturer's responsibility.
The military may have rejected an offer to build redundancy into the
design. Perhaps redundant safety equipment would have been expensive,
or perhaps it would have reduced some aspect of the weapon's perfor-
mance. In some cases, a manufacturer's warnings of possible accident
have been rejected by military officials. While it may be unreasonable to
consider that the military might choose broken technology, it is conceiv-
able that the military might choose to eliminate redundancy for fiscal or
performance reasons. The point here is that while a defect of commission
21 Harris v. Pettibone Corp., 488 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). See also Boeing
Airplane Co., 291 F.2d 310.
2 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986) (failure to fasten panel with redundant camlocks was
negligent).
2 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (failure to provide redundancy in longitudinal flight
control system was negligent).
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can usually be traced to an overt decision by either the military or the
manufacturer responsible for the design, a defect of omission may be
more difficult to ascribe. The following considerations may be relevant to
the inquiry: (1) the relative technical knowledge and expertise of the
military and the manufacturer; (2) whether the selection of the manu-
facturer came before or after the selection of the design; (3) whether
redundant safety design was customary for the technology in view of its
intended use; and (4) if similar accidents previously occurred, whether
the military chose to maintain the design or to fix it itself or to require
that the manufacturer fix the design.
Arguably, these questions interject the fact finder into the realm of
decision-making of weapons design in a manner without analogy in strict
liability litigation over commercial goods. While these matters may be no
more technologically complex than other controversies routinely liti-
gated, a challenge has been directed against the propriety of legal inquiry
into military procurement. The basis of this challenge is that to permit
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of liability for a design defect
in a weapon would thrust the judiciary into the position of overseeing
procurement decisions. Since this position is arguably inappropriate,
defendant/manufacturers should not be held liable and such litigation
should not be heard.
Properly understood, this challenge does not refute the prima facie
case: the accident was in fact caused by a design defect which was in fact
the result of an act of the defendant. Rather, this challenge asserts that
even if the prima facie case is factually demonstrable, there are super-
vening reasons why such litigation should be barred. This challenge thus
operates as an affirmative defense-where defendant can demonstrate
that the necessary conditions exist, the defendant is immune from
liability regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs tort claim. Hereinafter,
this challenge is referred to as the military contractor defense.
B. Establishing the Military Contractor Defense
The military contractor defense exempts a weapons maker from
liability for servicemen's injuries caused by its product. If the product was
provided to the military and if the defect was in the design specified by
the military, the manufacturer asserts the defense to avoid liability. If
the cause of injury was a manufacturing defect by the weapons maker,
then of course there is no reason to immunize a manufacturer from its
traditional liability for defective products. For the defense to stand, the
source of harm must be some military-mandated design over which the
manufacturer has little or no control.
The military is immune from liability; its determinations of appropri-
ate weapons design are not actionable, even under the limited waiver of
[Vol. 35:351
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sovereign immunity established by the Federal Tort Claims Act.24
Accordingly, it may be unfair to hold liable the weapons maker that has
provided the good according to the military's specifications. Tort law
traditionally places liability on the wrongdoer who caused the harm in
order to create incentives to prevent future harm; the manufacturer who
properly performs according to military specifications, however, is not in
a position to correct the tortious defect.
Besides the unfairness of holding the manufacturer liable for a design
defect for which it is not responsible, such imposition of liabililty may
ignore the fact that the manufacturer is an agent of the military, acting
pursuant to its command. Since the military can compel a manufacturer
to produce a weapon for a price,25 to enquire as to the manufacturer's
liability for defective designs would place the judiciary in a position to
second-guess military decisions. The procurement of high-performance
weapons at the cutting edge of technology that are intended for highly
sophisticated military missions demands a close working relationship
between industry and government in the design, testing, and manufac-
ture of the desired weapon. Product liability litigation involving judicial
evaluation of the competence with which a military decision was made
might threaten a substantial intrusion upon military prerogatives as
well as a potential burden to the weapons procurement process. The
courts have hesitated to set themselves the task of determining how
much attention must be given to safety risks by the military-or from
whom the military must receive opinions--before a command decision to
acquire a product in a given form is respected.
This section portrays the military contractor defense as the product of
three propositions: (1) the military is immune from product liability
litigation by servicemen; (2) a weapons maker can share that immunity
under certain circumstances; (3) the determination of when such circum-
stances exists may implicate concerns that the judiciary will interfere
with the formation of military policy.
1. The Military is Immune from Liability for Deciding to Use a
Weapon, Despite its Risk to Servicemen.
Indisputably, the military may not be sued by servicemen for service-
related injuries. Still debatable is whether this immunity applies when-
ever the victim is a serviceman on duty or whether it applies only if
matters of military discipline will be challenged in court. In Feres v.
United States,26 the widow of a lieutenant killed by fire in his Army
24 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674-2680 (1982).
' Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2169 (1982).
2s 340 U.S. 135 (1940).
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quarters in New York was denied the right to pursue her claim. Justice
Jackson ruled that since military activities have no analogy in state tort
law, the government should not be liable to servicemen in suits that
involve such activities. Furthermore, the distinctly federal relationship
between the government and military personnel should not be subject to
differing state laws according to the place of injury. Finally, the Veterans
Benefits Act 27 was enacted as a uniform compensation scheme and should
be viewed as the exclusive remedy for injured soldiers. It is ironic that the
principle for which Feres is currently cited was not asserted in the Court's
opinion. That principle is that suits by servicemen would threaten
military discipline and empower the courts to interfere with the manage-
ment of the military. Four years after Feres, the Court in United States v.
Brown,28 engrafted this onto the Feres rationale.
Under what circumstances does this immunity arise? In Brooks v.
United States,29 the Court permitted a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
suit by servicemen on leave hit by a government truck negligently driven
by a government employee. More recently, in Chappell v. Wallace,s the
Court denied recovery of damages and injunctive relief to five Navy
enlisted men who sued their superiors alleging racial discrimination. The
Court held that the special nature of military life, the need for unhesitat-
ing and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined
responses by enlisted personnel support denial of relief. The Court has
subsequently clarified that the only controlling rationale for the Feres
doctrine is the need to preserve military discipline31 In United States v.
Shearer,3 2 the mother of a serviceman murdered by a fellow soldier
(allegedly negligently discharged from military prison) was barred from
suit: the claim went directly to the management of the military calling
into question basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control
of a serviceman. This language does not suggest that the mere status of
the victim as a serviceman bars any and all tort recovery, and the lower
courts have not so held.33
27 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1976).
348 U.S. 110 (1954).
29 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
30 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
3 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190 (1983).
32 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
1 The Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983)
permitted the suit of a sergeant injured in an automobile leaving an allegedly negligently-
permitted Air Force party. The sergeant was at the party working in his off-duty time as a
bartender; no threat to military discipline was implicated by the suit. A number of courts
have refused to apply Fores to suits brought by veterans alleging that the military failed to
warn of dangers caused by having been exposed to a dangerous substance. Broudy v. United
States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwartz v. United States, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1967);
Targett v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Everett v. United States,
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Two recent Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed the Feres bar
to suits by servicemen against the government. In United States v.
Johnson,3 4 the Court by a 5-4 majority held that a Coast Guard pilot's
widow could not charge Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control-
lers with negligence because the Feres doctrine "has been applied
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the
government based upon service-related industries."35 The Court found
that the three broad rationales underlying Feres applied despite the fact
that the FAA is a civilian agency: (1) the federal relationship between the
government and servicemen; (2) the existence of generous statutory
disability and death benefits; and (3) the potential that servicemen's suits
against the government could disrupt military discipline.
The applicability of Feres was less central to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Stanley.36 The Court unanimously ruled that
plaintiff's FTCA claim for damages resulting from the alleged adminis-
tration to him of LSD had been improperly considered by the Court of
Appeals since it was not related to the certified order over which the court
had jurisdiction. On the very separate question of whether plaintiff could
proceed with a claim that a violation of constitutional rights can give rise
to a damages action against the offending federal officials even in the
absence of a statute authorizing such relief barring special factors
counselling hesitation, the Court split 5-4 in favor of dismissing such a
claim.
In a very real sense, these decisions interpreting Feres are not
implicated by the litigation against weapons makers. While it is difficult
to dispute that under any interpretation of Feres a suit by a serviceman
against the military for injuries sustained from a defective weapon must
be barred, nothing in Feres suggests that a serviceman may not be a
plaintiff in a civil lawsuit-the focus is rather on the immunity of the
government as a defendant. Feres signifies the judicial hesitance in
matters of military management and the need for military discipline to
be insulated from scrutiny in civil litigation. Whether that barrier also
protects weapons makers depends on whether a product liability suit
similarly jeopardizes these concerns such that the immunity which has
been afforded to the government should be extended to cover private
corporations.
492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980). But see Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Gaspart v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. La. 1982); Sheehan v. United States,
542 F. Supp. 18 (S.D. Miss. 1982), affd, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
975 (1984); Sweet v. United States, 628 F. Supp. 1068 (D.S.D. 1981) affd, 687 F.2d 246 (8th
Cir. 1982); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
34 107 S.Ct. 2063 (1987).
"5 Id. at 2067.
36 107 S.Ct. 3054 (1987).
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2. A Weapons-Maker is Immune if it Follows the Military's
Reasonably Precise Specifications, Unless the Contractor Knew More
than the Military About Dangers Inherent in the Weapon's Design.
a. The Contract Specification Defense
Early cases involving public works projects generously immunized
contractors who fully complied with government specifications if those
specifications were not so obviously defective and dangerous that a
competent contractor would not have followed them and if the injury was
attributable to a flaw in the specifications. When the government
contracts with the private sector to assist it in performing a governmen-
tal function, the contractor is merely an instrumentality to carry out that
function; the government has deputized the contractor. Thus, in Yearsley
v. WA. Ross Construction Co.,3 7 the Court held that a Corps of Engineers
contractor was immune from liability for diverting the course of the
Missouri River so long as the diversion was within the scope of its
authority. "[I]t is clear that if this authority to carry out the project was
validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional
power of Congress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for
executing its will."38 Subsequent decisions involving allegations of neg-
ligence in the performance of a service for the government have rein-
forced this defense.3 9
Subsequent decisions involving contracts to supply goods have not been
so easily resolved. With the rise of strict liability for products, the fact
that the contractor was not negligent may be irrelevant since it is only
necessary that the product be defective when it leaves the defendants'
control and that the defect be the cause of the injury. In Challoner v. Day
& Zimmerman,40 an injured serviceman and the heir/estate of another
serviceman sued the manufacturer of a howitzer round which prema-
turely exploded during combat with the North Vietnamese. Judgment in
plaintiffs' favor was upheld despite defendants' contention that the trial
judge erred in instructing the jury that it could find the defendants liable
if it found that the howitzer shell was defectively designed. Even though
the design of the shell was within the exclusive control of the govern-
ment, the contract specification defense did not bar an action in strict
liability since a primary goal of strict liability is to allocate the costs of
37 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
38 Id. at 19.
19 Meyers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963) (work on a federal highway in
conformity with the terms of the contract was not subject to liability); Dolphin Gardens, Inc.
v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1964) (authority to dredge a channel conferred
immunity on the contractor who had complied with the contract requirements).
40 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for misapplication of conflict of
laws rules, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
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injuries caused by defective products to manufacturers instead of to the
persons injured by the products, including members of the armed forces.
Furthermore, when the controversy involves the supply of goods, a
substantial question is raised regarding the manufacturer's duty of care
in light of the exception to the defense for specifications which are
obviously defective and dangerous. Although the purpose of the defense is
to hold the obedient contractor to a lower standard of care than the
contractor who has itself drafted the specifications, this defense is not
without limits. In Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co.,41 Judge Learned
Hand held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that one
contractor was liable for defects in the specifications which would have
been obvious to an electrical engineer since the contractor employed an
electrical engineer, but another contractor was held to a lower standard
since he had no engineer in his employ. Thus, the inquiry is whether the
design defect should have been obvious to the contractor in light of the
contractor's expertise.
The most serious problem in the application of the contract specifica-
tion defense arises when the manufacturer is granted some discretion as
to the details of the product's design or when the contractor has
participated in the design of the product. In these cases, the supplier of
goods to the government is more like an arms-length bargainer than a
deputy carrying out the sovereign's will. Whether the contractor is
transacting business with the government as its customer or with its
private sector customers, no defense exists if the contractor has discretion
in the manner of accomplishing the work. Clearly, when the contract
establishes only performance specifications stating the desired outcome
and characteristics for the item without specifying the process by which
that outcome will be obtained, it is inappropriate for the contract
specification defense to bar recovery. 42 More problematic is when the
contracting process entails a cooperative effort between the government
and a manufacturer before the government ultimately decides on a
particular design. From an informal suggestion through compromises
during development and testing, the manufacturer can be intimately
involved with the government in designing the product. Whether the
contract specification defense should be applied in such circumstances
was addressed in O'Keefe v. Boeing Co.,43 involving a wrongful death
action against the manufacturer of an Air Force B-52 which crashed,
allegedly as a result of a defectively designed welded bulkhead. The court
recognized that the ultimate responsibility for the design of the B-52
rested with the government--
41 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951).
" Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961).
43 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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[TIhis fact, in itself, neither exonerates the defendant, nor has
it in any way altered the defendant's duty as a manufacturer in
this case where there has been no showing that the defendant was
totally oblivious of and/or aloof from the genesis of the design
specifications in the first place or that the specifications repre-
sented either something less than the uppermost level of the art
or a compromise of safety."
These decisions which have limited the contract specification defense
recognize that a manufacturer may not be negligent in performing
according to specifications even if those specifications later cause inju-
ries. It may be reasonable, therefore, to suggest that where the alleged
flaw in the design was the result of a conscious choice by the government
after balancing all relevant considerations, then the contractor is not at
fault. However, where the contractor is negligent in not having perceived
an obvious defect, then the defense is effectively forfeited. The defense
does not apply whatsoever where, in fact, the contractor is not merely the
government's agent but is instead an active participant in the critical
design.
b. The Emergence of The Military Contractor Defense
Precisely because of the limited applicability of the contract specifica-
tion defense, defendants in product liability actions involving weapons
have sought a type of immunity from liability for design defects in cases
where the military would itself be immune under Feres. This military
contractor defense, unlike the contract specification defense, permits the
contractor to share the military's sovereign immunity. Properly under-
stood, the military contractor defense is far broader than the contract
specification defense since it applies to anyone engaged in the design of
weaponry regardless of responsibility for defects so long as the manufac-
turer notified the military of all known risks and correctly manufactured
the item. Whereas the contract specification defense was based on the
unfairness of holding the obedient contractor liable for defects beyond its
control, the military contractor defense is based on a public policy
rationale of insulating the weapons procurement process from judicial
scrutiny for product liability. For these reasons, the military contractor
defense stands separately from the contract specification defense, raises
policy considerations not raised by the specification defense, and could
fall without jeopardizing the specification defense.
The extension of sovereign immunity to military contractors is a recent
invention. Twenty years ago, the judiciary recognized no defense for a
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Harvell-Kilgore Corp.,45 the maker of a hand grenade that prematurely
exploded injuring plaintiff during combat training was held liable despite
the fact that it was operating a government-owned plant, using materials
supplied by the government, and that the contract provided for indemni-
fication by the government for losses. Furthermore, the grenade fuses
were inspected by the government on the government's X-ray machine
operated by government employees. These facts did not, however, justify
granting sovereign immunity to the defendant simply because it occupied
"a near-symbiotic relationship with the military."
4
This position began to erode during the mid-1970s under stress from
the convergence of two lines of case law. First, the Supreme Court
definitively insulated the military from liability for defective weapons by
applying Feres to a suit brought by a manufacturer. In Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States,47 the Court considered whether the
United States was liable under the FTCA to indemnify a third party for
damages paid by it to a member of the Armed Forces. Stencel had
supplied North American Rockwell, the prime contractor, with egress
life-support systems consisting of ejection seat kits, parachutes, and
parachute packs for the F-100 and F-102 aircraft. During testing of the
product, failures were discovered by Stencel, indicating that the design of
the parachute pack container was faulty. Despite Stencel's urgings that
the Air Force change the design of the system, the Air Force refused to
allow Stencel to implement its recommended changes. Stencel produced
the units which later caused the death of Captain Werner when his
parachute malfunctioned after he ejected from his F-102. Werner sued
Stencel; Stencel settled for $187,000.48 The Court ruled that permitting
tort recovery against the government would encourage second-guessing
of military orders and would require testimony of members of the services
as to each other's decisions and actions. By dismissing Stencel's claim for
indemnification, the Court essentially rendered Stencel solely liable for
having fulfilled its contract according to government-prescribed specifi-
cations.49
45 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969).
46 Accord Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) ("The doctrine
of sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover the fault of a private corporation.").
47 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
48 Stencel's settlement is somewhat problematic for the development of legal doctrine.
Perhaps if Stencel had litigated the case, it would have been exonerated by the contract
specification defense. Stencel's suit for indemnification, therefore, appears to be something
of an end run around Feres with the contractor as the passive intermediary allowing a
serviceman to recover for injuries caused by the military's deliberate selection of a
dangerous design.
49 431 U.S. at 674, n. 8. The Court, in a footnote, denied any unfairness because Stencel
"no doubt had sufficient notice so as to take this risk [i.e., being held liable without
indemnification by the government] into account in negotiating its contract for the emer-
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The second line of cases concerned the proof requirements for the
contract specification defense in the unique factual instances involving
military procurement. This line begins with Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.,50
where a serviceman injured when thrown from an Army jeep could not
recover for the manufacturer's failure to equip the vehicle with seat belts
and a roll bar. Ford had designed seat belts to be installed in the jeep, but
the Army rejected installation because they were incompatible with the
intended use of the vehicle. As in regard to Stencel, this dispute may have
justified the contract specification defense. The trial court, however,
couched its decision in sovereign immunity: "To impose liability on a
governmental contractor who strictly complies with the plans and spec-
ifications provided to it by the Army in a situation such as this would
seriously impair the government's ability to formulate policy and make
judgments pursuant to its war powers."51 The Appellate Division re-
treated from this language stressing that Ford had no discretion with
respect to the safety devices in light of the conscious, intentional
determination by the military not to include seat belts. Nevertheless,
Sanner has been cited for the proposition that sovereign immunity
applies to contractors even in cases lacking an express decision by the
government against a design change which would have remedied the
defect. Thus, in Casabianca v. Casabianca,52 recovery was denied to the
civilian victim of an allegedly defective dough mixer built during WWII
in accordance with Army specifications for use in field kitchens. Without
exhaustive inquiry as to who was responsible for the defect, the New
York Supreme Court ruled that a supplier to the military during wartime
has a right to rely on specifications; if not, manufacturers may withhold
needed equipment from the Armed Forces because they consider the
designs to be imprudent or dangerous.
The product of these two lines of cases was that the courts repeatedly
held weapons procurement decisions to be beyond judicial scrutiny. These
cases may well have been correctly decided on their facts since in each
instance the contractor was obedient to the explicit compulsion of
military specifications. However, the doctrine enunciated in Stencel
suggested that a manufacturer may get trapped in an indefensible
dilemma while the doctrine enunciated in Sanner and Casabianca
suggested that broader application of the military's immunity could
protect the procurement process by insulating the compliant manufac-
gency eject system at issue here." This suggests that the Court consciously declined to
preclude the manufacturer's liability because these manufacturers can set their bid prices
to reflect this risk.
50 144 N.J. Super. 1,364 A.2d 43 (1976), affd 154 N. J. Super. 407,381 A.2d 805 (1977),
cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
s Id. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47.
62 104 Misc.2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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turer so trapped. In this regard, the failure properly to assert the contract
specification defense in cases where it arguably may have applied has
directly spawned claims of sovereign immunity for military contractors.
c. Disputes re The Compulsion Requirement
Operationally, the difference between the contract specification de-
fense and the military contractor defense is whether defendant bears the
burden of proving governmental compulsion. Where such compulsion is
factually demonstrable there is no independent need to extend sovereign
immunity; the military contractor defense is separately significant only
where proof of compulsion is absent or ambiguous. Recent cases have thus
focused on the question of whether a defense based on sovereign immu-
nity will stand if the military chose rather than ordered the design
subsequently alleged to be defective.
That the current controversy over the military contractor defense
stems from the Agent Orange litigation bears witness to Justice Holmes
admonition that hard cases make bad law. "Agent Orange" refers to
herbicides used by the United States as defoliants in the Vietnam War to
improve visibility of the enemy and to destroy the enemy's food supply.
The manufacture of one of the herbicides generated an extremely toxic
byproduct known as dioxin which allegedly was inhaled by servicemen as
seventeen million gallons of Agent Orange were sprayed over Vietnam
from 1962 to 1971. These servicemen have since complained of birth
defects, cancer, immune system dysfunction and other physical disorders
as well as symptoms of mental distress such as dizziness and depression.
Suit against the manufacturers of Agent Orange led defendants to assert
that the government had invented Agent Orange and had compelled its
production despite knowledge of its dangers. Further, defendants claimed
that they had manufactured Agent Orange in strict compliance with
government specifications as they were required to do under the Defense
Production Act.53 According to the plaintiffs, however, the manufacturers
owned their plants as well as the raw materials and the final product and
were primarily responsible for inspection of the product. Furthermore,
every manufacturer was active in the solicitation of military contracts
and, according to the Department of Justice, the government never
sought or anticipated any contract for Agent Orange until the manufac-
turers convinced the government of its desirability.54 Early settlement of
the litigation failed to resolve this factual disparity.
Prior to settlement, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
government contract defense required that defendant manufacturers
prove that they had no responsibility for formulation of the specifications.
0 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2169 (1976).
4 Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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Instead, the court stated that the defense could be invoked if defendants
proved: (1) the government established the specifications for the product;
(2) the product complied with the government specifications in all
material respects; and (3) the government knew as much as or more than
the defendants did about the hazards that accompanied use of the
product. 55 Critically important was the substitution of "specifications
established by the government" for the compulsion requirement de-
manded by earlier courts:
The purpose of a government contract defense in the context of
this case is to permit the government to wage war in whatever
manner the government deems advisable, and to do so with the
support of suppliers of military weapons. Considerations of cost,
time of production, risks to participants, risks to third parties,
and any other factors that might weigh on the decisions of
whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon, are uniquely
questions for the military and should be exempt from review by
civilian courts... . A supplier to the government under specifica-
tions established by the government is exempt from liability
whether the theory of the claim be negligence or strict products
liability.56
What is meant by the phrase "specifications established by the govern-
ment?" How is this requirement substantively different from the compul-
sion requirement of Sanner? Numerous decisions coming on the heels of
Agent Orange have struggled with these questions and provide a spec-
trum of opinion. At one pole is Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp.,57 where the
court refused to permit defendants to argue to the jury that the unex-
pected explosion of an atomic simulator did not establish strict liability
for the death of a soldier despite defendants' argument that they had
followed government specifications. According to the court, Agent Orange
applied only to weapons manufactured during war; during peacetime,
some involvement by the manufacturer in the design of the product was
sufficient to deny summary judgment sought on the basis of sovereign
immunity. Similarly, in Johnston v. United States,5 8 the court found the
defense inapplicable to the production of an item which was simply an
adaptation of an item already sold in private commerce and where the
manufacturer has had substantial input into the product's design. Sev-
eral cases involving claims for asbestos-related injuries have also rejected
rs In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
5 Id. at 1054.
5 551 F. Supp. 110 (D. Haw. 1982).
68568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
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the defense. The court in In re Related Asbestos Cases,59 denied summary
judgment sought by defendants sued for having provided asbestos to the
Navy. Because government strictures placed on defendants varied during
the performance of their contracts, emphasized the court, the degree of
compulsion required for the defense was not shown.
A somewhat looser standard was developed by the Third Circuit in a
series of decisions in Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.6o Plaintiff member
of the Army Reserve was injured when a falling tree crushed the
tractor-bulldozer he was operating. Plaintiff did not dispute that defen-
dant made the item pursuant to the military's specifications but claimed
that it was defectively designed for lack of a protective device over the
passenger seat and for lack of warning of danger to occupants in tree
removal operations. In Brown 1,61 the court reversed defendants' sum-
mary judgment and instructed that while it might be persuaded that a
contractor must prove some degree of compulsion in order to successfully
raise the defense, under Pennsylvania law the contractor need only
establish that it executed the government's specifications carefully. After
a jury verdict in favor of the manufacturer, the court in Brown 11,62 ruled
that the issue in a design defect case is whether the design of the product
is or is not that called for by the specifications."6 3
d. McKay
While the defenses approved in Agent Orange and Brown are ambigu-
ous regarding the compulsion requirement, there is little in these
opinions to suggest the leap taken by the Ninth Circuit in McKay v.
RockwellInternational Corp.64 The court adopted a standard for applying
the military contractor defense which is considerably more lenient by
permitting a manufacturer to invoke the defense in situations where it
selects a defective design and the military merely approves it. Widows of
two Navy pilots convinced the district court that the cause of their
husbands' deaths was the unreasonably dangerous and defective ejection
components on their RA-5C jet aircraft. Rockwell was held liable under
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts for damages in excess of
$700,000. The Ninth Circuit, however, expressed concern that such
liability would: (1) subvert the Feres/Stencel rule, since military suppliers
" 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D.Cal. 1982). See also, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United
States, No. 79-0382 (D. Haw. Oct. 20, 1983 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)); Plas v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., No. C-78-946 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 1983 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file)); Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 55624 (Haw. Cir. CL May 24, 1982);
Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 11. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983).
60 741 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1984); 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982).
61 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982).
62 741 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1984).
63 Id. at 662.
4 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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would pass the cost of accidents off to the military through cost overrun
or insurance provisions in contracts or through higher prices on later
sales; (2) thrust the judiciary into the making of military decisions
implicating concerns for military discipline as well as national security;
(3) interfere with the military's efforts to push defense technology toward
its limits; and (4) encourage fixing the locus of responsibility for design
defects with more precision than is possible since manufacturers work
closely with military authorities. Consequently, military contractors
should be immune from liability except when only minimal or very
general requirements are set for the contractor by the United States.
This immunity from liability may be established where: (1) the United
States is immune from liability under Feres and Stencel; (2) the supplier
proves that the United States established, or approved, reasonably
precise specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment;
(3) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (4) the supplier
warned the United States about patent errors in the government's
specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.65
The court rejected the need for prices of a weapon to reflect the cost of
accidents caused by its use since "[mleeting adequately the need of
national defense, not accident costs, is the ultimate standard by which
purchases of military equipment must be measured."66 Furthermore,
since the military has the ability to recognize safety problems and
negotiate with suppliers, imposition of liability would "no doubt increase
defense costs but would do little not already being done to increase the
safety features in military equipment."6 7 Third, the Veteran's Benefits
Act generously compensates the serviceman or his family, unlike the case
of an ordinary consumer injured by a defective product. Finally,
[M]embers of the armed forces are not ordinary consumers with
respect to military equipment. Their "reasonable expectations of
safety" are much lower than those of ordinary consumers. They
recognize when they join the armed forces that they may be
exposed to grave risks of danger, such as having to bail out of a
disabled aircraft. This is part of the job. The Nation sometimes
demands their very lives. This is an immutable feature of their
calling. To regard them as ordinary consumers would demean
and dishonor the high station in public esteem to which, because
of their exposure to danger, they are justly enriched.6 8
It is difficult to measure the value of public esteem to Lieutenant
65 Id. at 451.
66 Id. at 452.
67 Id.
" Id. at 453.
[Vol. 35:351
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss3/4
LIABILITY OF WEAPONS MAKERS
McKay's widow. If Rockwell could prove by the preponderance of evidence
that "the United States established, or approved, reasonably precise
specifications for the ejection system"69 then the law will not demean
Lieutenant McKay's calling by awarding damages. Only if the United
States neither set specifications for the system (other than general
outlines of what type of system it required) nor approved Rockwell's final
reasonably detailed specifications may Rockwell be liable.
Dissenting, Judge Alarcon focused on the fact that "the only specifica-
tions which Rockwell adhered to were initially produced by its own
design staff."70 Subsequent military ratification "should not alter
Rockwell's primary responsibility for their content and adequacy. 71
Agreeing that servicemen are entitled to high honor and esteem, Judge
Alarcon took issue with the majority's description of its source:
Military personnel are honored and esteemed because they are
willing to fight for their country and risk their lives doing so.
They are not so respected because they are sometimes forced by
their calling to use unsatisfactory or unsafe equipment. It is the
Military's, Rockwell's and this court's duty to insure that our
servicemen are provided with reliable and safe equipment. Just
as the Military can make any parachute packer take one that he
has just folded and make him jump with it, the court should
require that Rockwell stand behind the products for which it
voluntarily contracts and provides at a profit. To extend the
contractor defense in the way the majority suggests will only
result in more unsafe and unreliable equipment. To do so would
unnecessarily increase the danger which our military personnel
face so patriotically.72
e. McKay's Progeny: Emerging Concerns for Separation of Powers
Subsequent courts have not all agreed with Judge Alarcon that it is the
law's duty to insure that our servicemen are provided with reliable and
safe equipment. The Third Circuit has twice held that, under Pennsyl-
vania law, where the military made all final decisions as to specifications,
the defense would apply because of concerns for separation of powers.
73
This principle was held to bar judicial second-guessing of military
judgments so long as there was true government participation (more than
mere rubber-stamping) in the design. The Seventh Circuit similarly held
69 Id. at 451.
70 Id. at 459.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 461.
" Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985);
In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on Sept. 11, 1982, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 851 (1986).
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that Wisconsin law barred liability and that the McKay test best reflects
the policies underlying the defense.74
The Fifth Circuit displayed considerable sympathy for manufacturers
who have been increasingly threatened "with liability that could not be
passed on to the party ultimately responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries-
the government."75 Litigation over such liability would compel the courts
to second-guess professional military judgment-a task for which courts
have little competence and which raises significant separation of powers
concerns. Consequently, to ask the defendant to prove that the military
demanded production of its own design would not reflect the policies of
the defense.
[A] requirement of compulsion of this sort would discourage
military contractors from bidding on government projects or,
alternatively, give the contractors incentive to pressure the
military to purchase safer equipment. Either result would be
contrary to sound public policy, which requires that contractors
be encouraged to enter into contracts with the government for the
production of military hardware and to adhere fully to specifica-
tions furnished by the government. While it is reasonable to
expect a military contractor to apprise the government of any
risks relating to the equipment of which it has knowledge, the
contractor, like the judiciary, should not be thrust into the
position of second-guessing military decisions. 76
Bynum's focus on separation of powers helps address the issue of what
must the defendant manufacturer prove in order to apply the McKay
defense. The expansion of the contractor defense in McKay (to cases
involving government approval of reasonably precise specifications) left
unanswered the type and amount of evidence required. Bynum clarified
that this threshold is quite low since "interference by civilian courts with
military authority raises questions about both judicial competency in this
area and separation of powers." The judiciary can not and should not
decide whether the manufacturer or the military was responsible for the
defect because "there can be no question that the design of military
equipment is, at bottom, a military decision."77
This position was adopted and expanded by the Fourth Circuit's recent
trilogy: Tozer v. LTV Corp.,78 Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 79 and Boyle v. United
7 Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985).
78 Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1985).
71 Id. at 574-75.
7 Id. at 569.
781 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
79 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Technologies Corp.80 Asserting that it was "unseemly that a democracy's
most serious decisions, those providing for common survival and defense,
be made by its least accountable branch of government,"8 1 the court ruled
that "it is nearly impossible to contend that the contractor defectively
designed a piece of equipment without actively criticizing a military
decision."8 2 Consequently, "the contractor's participation in design-or
even its origination of specifications-- does not constitute a waiver of the
government contractor defense."83 Only if the government did not ap-
prove the design is inquiry and perhaps liability appropriate.
It should be noted that two courts have not accepted the line of
authority from McKay to Boyle. In Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp.,84
the court denied that public policy required any judicial restraint because
the design decision at issue was a non-military decision requiring no
military expertise nor did it involve a conscious decision on the part of the
military to accept a known hazard because of military considerations.
The evidence did not show that the military consciously decided on the
specific design for military reasons; it showed that design determinations
were left to the discretion and expertise of General Dynamics:
General Dynamics was hired for the expertise and the experi-
ence it possessed. The government neither possessed the qualifi-
cations nor the ability to engage in any substantial review of
General Dynamics' specifications. Moreover, the design decisions,
material to the defects alleged, required no military expertise,
therefore, there is no justification for insulating General Dynam-
ics from liability where the government merely approves of the
decision.... The government's approval in this case is no differ-
ent from the approval of any product or design prepared for the
government. If that type of approval is sufficient to satisfy the
[defense], then there would never be a recovery under any
circumstances against defense contractors.
8 5
According to Trevino, judicial inquiry-at least so far as to determine
whether real military interests were at stake-is appropriate. Further-
more, if defendant cannot prove that the design defect was the result of a
definite military selection, then the defense may not apply. In this sense,
the nature of the decision-making process may be factually relevant as
may be whether the reason for the defect was related to traditional
military concerns for strength and mobility, etc. The Eleventh Circuit, in
80 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987).
81 792 F.2d at 405.
82 Id. at 406.
83 Id. at 407.
' 626 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
as Id. at 1337.
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Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,86 also recognized a judicial role in
determining whether, in fact, the military had decided that the risk of
injury to servicemen from a design defect in the equipment it ordered is
a risk that it (the military) is willing to take. As a consequence, the
manufacturer must prove the negative proposition that the design in
question does not merely represent its own judgment by showing either
that it did not participate in the design of the defective product or that it
warned the military of the risks of the design. The purpose of this
requirement is for the judiciary to determine whether or not a military
judgment to proceed with the dangerous design was actually made. If not,
then no separation of powers concerns are raised and the contractor is
subject to the customary strictures of product liability law.
3. Would the Formation of Military Policy be Jeopardized by
Judicial Inquiry into the Responsibility for the Design of a
Military-Approved Weapon?
Commentators on the military contractor defense have discussed
numerous purported bases for the defense. It is the thesis of Part One of
this Article that, in truth, there exists only one base for immunizing
weapons makers from liability-that the defense is necessary to protect
the military establishment from judicial scrutiny. Part Two of this
Article will attempt to demonstrate the reasons why this base should not
be legally recognized as support for civil tort immunity. The remaining
comments here in Part One are for purposes of dismissing the various
make-weight arguments and to hone the critical legal issue which the
judiciary must soon decide.
a. The Unfairness Justification
At the outset, it may be argued that holding a manufacturer strictly
liable for supplying defective weapons is unfair. The manufacturer is
thus portrayed as the passive means by which the military accomplishes
its ends. This is simply inaccurate for most military procurement. Most
sophsticated procurement matters are intentionally the result of designs
developed by contractors, not by government employees. Indeed, recog-
nition that the government does not have the expertise to develop many
high technology weapons systems underlies our reliance on the private
sector for the tools of national defense.8 7 To assume that in all or even
86 778 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1985).
" See Government Contractors' Product Liability and Indemnification Acts, 1984:
Hearings on H.R. 4083 and H.R. 4199 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 50 (1984)
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most cases the manufacturer has no choice regarding the design of a
weapon misconstrues the procurement process. More to the point, where
the manufacturer finds itself caught in the untenable position of facing
liability for merely producing what the government has ordered it to
produce, the contract specification defense can and should be applied.
This puts a relatively straight-forward burden on the defendant to
establish that it entered into the contract after specifications were
developed without its involvement. In the few cases where imposition of
liability would be unfair, therefore, there is no need to employ the
military contractor defense.
b. The Cost-Savings Justification
No more compelling is the McKay court's justification that imposing
liability on military contractors will cause them to reflect these higher
costs in future contract prices. This is an ironically troubling argument
because it seems to contravene so blatantly principles of separation of
powers. The first objection is that there is little factual support for the
assertion that manufacturers will pass on these higher costs to the
government. Such an assertion suggests that now it is the military which
is wholly passive in accepting the prices offered to it by its contractors.
Such passivity is hardly more likely than the alleged passivity of the
manufacturers discussed above. Congress and the Pentagon have ardu-
ously sought to promote competition for procurement contracts, as will be
discussed infra. Critics may contend that military procurement is not as
competitive as it should be; but that is no reason to take judicial notice of
the alleged fact that contractors face no competitive pressures whatso-
ever and therefore can pass higher costs to the Pentagon automatically.
More likely is that if product liability applies in the competitive market
for weaponry, manufacturers who defectively design products and conse-
quently pay damages will suffer a loss of market position vis-a-vis their
more careful competitors.
The second objection to the cost justification for McKay is that it
completely ignores the fact that avoidable accidents involving service-
men and weaponry have high costs for the military. That is, it may very
well be economically efficient for the military if the courts held manu-
facturers liable in tort for defectively designed products. The military
invests significant resources not only in equipment but in the servicemen
who use that equipment; the loss of these resources is a waste which
cannot serve the interests of national security. Therefore, it may be hoped
that future contract prices reflect the responsibility borne by manufac-
(testimony of Richard K. Willard, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Dept.
of Justice).
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turers; imposition of liability can serve to spread risks over many
products sold to a large consuming public. The law has long supported
the social value in cost spreading as a pillar of modern product liability
law.
The third objection to this justification is simply that the Ninth Circuit
invented it. There is nothing in Feres or Stencel or any other Supreme
Court decision which suggests that the basis for barring a serviceman's
claim is fear of higher prices. As has been discussed at length herein, a
consistent line of authority from Feres to Stencel to Shearer recognizes
that the military's immunity from suit derives from concerns for military
discipline and separation of powers. These concerns are the focus of the
remainder of this Article; it demeans the arguments on either side to
claim that the issue really is that the government wants to save some
money.
A fourth objection is that if the rationale for the military contractor
defense is protection of the public treasury, why are civilians-injured as
a result of a defectively designed product purchased and used by the
government-permitted to sue. No court has ever held that servicemen
should have fewer rights than their civilian counterparts because the
need to protect the public treasury is an onus uniquely theirs to bear.
Furthermore, this purported justification wholly ignores the fact that in
most contracts for military procurement, the manufacturer must pur-
chase liability insurance. The military can, of course, choose to cover the
cost of premiums in the contract price, just as the civilian branches of
government can cover the premiums for insurance obtained by civilian
contractors. Indeed, the McKay concern for higher military contract
prices is wholly illusory, since the government's account is not likely to
change regardless of the defense. Instead, it will have paid for liability
insurance to cover a non-existent liability-and the only beneficiaries of
the defense will be the insurers.
Most importantly, even if these objections are all discarded, one must
ask whether the judiciary has the authority to create a legal immunity in
order to reduce the costs of military procurement. The constitutional
power to raise and equip armies is, of course, given to Congress. Congress
has chosen to entrust the task of producing weaponry to private enter-
prises who sell their expert efforts to the military for a profit. In all
respects, these transactions are subject to the law of the land except
where Congress specifically provides otherwise. Congress could, of
course, immunize weapons makers from product liability if it so chose; it
has not. What cause is there for the judiciary to immunize what Congress
has left alone?
c. The Military Discipline Justification
There is a real judicial concern that the legal system not be used to
invade the prerogatives of military discipline. Underlying Feres are:
(1) the need to bar soldiers from using the civilian courts to challenge a
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military order from a superior; and (2) the need to protect members of the
military from being compelled to testify against each other. As explained
above, there is no logical nexus between these understandable concerns
for military discipline and the military contractor defense.
The Department of Justice has recently argued that denial of the
military contractor defense will permit a plaintiff/serviceman to demon-
strate that a military purchasing judgment was unknowing-that his
superiors "lacked the competence to make the judgment they made and
that, therefore, more disclosure on the part of the contractor was required
than was given."8 8 It is difficult to perceive the logic in this argument.
The military contractor defense is, of course, an affirmative defense pled
in a private civil suit between a serviceman and a weapons maker. In the
absence of the defense, the plaintiff/serviceman must show that the cause
of injury was a design defect. There is no necessary suggestion that the
military purchaser of that equipment was in any way incompetent. Only
if the defense is allowed will potentially conflicting military testimony be
necessary as defendants attempt to show that it was the military which
specifically requested the product despite knowledge of the defect. If the
military contractor defense was legally rejected, responsibility for the
defect would legally fall on the manufacturer without need to scrutinize
the military's role in the procurement process.
d. The Need to Protect the Defense Establishment from
Judicial Scrutiny
As stated, this is the only justification for the military contractor
defense which deserves serious attention. The role of the judiciary does
not include making or even influencing the military policy of the United
States. The decision in time of war to develop a weapon or to use a weapon
in pursuit of a military purpose can not be a reviewable matter for a court
of law. Even in peace, the United States confronts a threatening world
which looks to it as a force of stability; therefore, there exists a continuing
need for preparedness unimpeded by the judiciary. When establishing
military policy, those in authority must make hard decisions to push
technology and strategy to outer limits perhaps knowing the statistical
probability that servicemen will die obeying those decisions. Further-
more, those decision-makers must rely on an efficient and sophisticated
private sector to provide the equipment without which policy is a mere
paper tiger. On occasion, the decisions that are made in pursuit of our
national security will not accord safety the primary value that it is given
in making decisions regarding what goods should be produced for civilian
use. A command decision to acquire a product in a given form could
88 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985).
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ignore safety criteria altogether (although one might hope not) without
incurring legal consequences. No one reasonably familiar with our
constitutional separation of powers could argue to the contrary.
The issue spotlighted by the military contractor defense, however, is
not strictly whether the judiciary should second-guess military decisions;
more accurately, it is when should the judiciary recognize that a military
decision has in fact been made which compels judicial deference. There
are only two possible answers to this issue: either judicial deference is
appropriate whenever the controversy involves a weapon acquired by the
military, or judicial deference is appropriate only when defendant can
prove that the defect which caused the injury is the direct result of a
military decision to accept the risk. To adopt the former position
essentially treats weapons makers as identical to the military itself. To
adopt the latter position requires that in each case a court decide that the
military actually made a decision to use a product that it knew to be
defective and dangerous to servicemen. To adopt the former position
confers a virtual immunity from liability to any weapons maker which
can only be forfeited by failing to warn of known hazards. The single
virtue of this position is that it easily and uniformly negates any judicial
obligation to impose accountability for the consequences of procuring
weapons for our defense. To adopt the latter position does require that the
courts at least make an initial determination whether military policy is,
in fact, implicated in a given controversy. Only if the defendant can
establish that the military commanded the decision to employ the
allegedly defective design would judicial deference be warranted. The
former position confers near-sovereign immunity on private companies;
the latter position confers nothing that is not already provided by the
contract specification defense. The starkness of the choice is absolutely
clear. The Supreme Court can choose one position or it can choose the
other, but it cannot choose both nor can it compromise nor can it base its
choice on considerations other than separation of powers. Part Two of this
Article respectfully advocates the rejection of the military contractor
defense and suggests that the latter position which permits product
liability litigation except where the contract specification defense would
apply is the only choice consonant with our democracy's pursuit of
national security under law.
m. PART Two: THE PROCUREMN'r SYSTs'S CONCEPT OF AccouNTABILrry
AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Part Two contains three sections. Section A examines the process of
weapons contracting and suggests that this process provides readily
accessible standards by which to ascertain responsibility for weapons
design. Section B highlights the methods to assign the responsibility for
a weapons system's design through the production process. Section C
discusses the role of litigation in enforcing accountability.
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A. Contracting For Weapons8 9
Weapons makers formally enter the weapons acquisition system
through the contracting process. This section describes two aspects of that
process: (1) the distinction between formally advertised and negotiated
solicitations for contracts; and (2) the distinction between design and
performance specifications in weapons procurement contracts.
This section will assert two critical points regarding the military
contractor defense. First, while procurement policy contemplates a close
working relationship between the military and members of the weapons
industry, that relationship does not contravene the fact that each party
has severable interests and obligations. Under this nation's procurement
system, the military has the authority to determine military needs and to
exercise its judgment, within legal limits, to satisfy those munitions
needs; private entrepreneurs have the opportunity to respond to the
military's demand in a manner which, subject to legal limits, maximizes
each entrepreneur's self-interest. Furthermore, the weapons acquisition
process is, in all material respects, supposed to reflect the operation of
typical market forces. That process clearly manifests a policy in favor of
arms-length relationships subject to the strictures of commercial law.
Second, the courts regularly and routinely consider exactly analogous
issues to those which would be raised in a serviceman's tort suit alleged
in McKay et al to be improper for judicial review. This section suggests
that to distinguish those contracts where the contractor is simply
following advertised design specifications from those contracts where the
contractor designed a weapon in response to performance specifications
does not necessarily implicate issues of national security or military
policy. For a court of law to distinguish between advertised contracts and
negotiated contracts is not complicated nor is the task of distinguishing
design from performance specifications. The relevant category for most
product liability litigation-negotiated contracts containing performance
specifications-includes virtually all of the recent cases discussed in Part
One. As to these cases, a determination of whether the contractor was in
fact responsible for the faulty design is steps away from an inquiry into
military policy. This is not to deny that there may be occasional cases
whose pursuit could involve inquiries into military policy, but those
problems may be coped with selectively. The point here is that it wholly
misconstrues the procurement process to assert that establishing
whether a contractor is responsible for a weapons design defect would
improperly interfere with the formation of military policy. On the
" The bases of this section derive generally from three sources: J. Fox, ARbING
AImRIcA-How TuE U.S. Buys WEAPONS (1974); D. PACE, NEOTrATIoN AND MANAGEM NT OF
DEFENSE CONTACTS (1970); M. PEcK Am D. SCHERER, THE WEAPONS AcQuismoN PROcEss (1962).
Specific citations are noted as appropriate.
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contrary, the judiciary should continue to uphold a well-entrenched and
well-justified line of demarcation distinguishing the formation of mili-
tary policy from the contractor's task of designing a weapon.
1. Advertised or Negotiated Solicitations
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 provides for two methods
of letting contracts: formal advertising and negotiation. While formal
advertising-calling for sealed bids from contractors--is the traditional
method of government contracting and is statutorily preferred,9 D it
accounts for only about a third of total procurement, most of which is
concentrated in supplies and small weaponry. Formal advertising has as
its main goal the promotion of the benefits of full and free competition:
lower prices, better quality, and increased output. A contractor may
simply enter a dollar amount in the SOA or IFB, seal it, and deliver it to
the procurement office where it will be publicized along with all other
bids to ensure the integrity of the advertising process. 91 Contracts subject
to formal advertising must be awarded to the responsible bidder whose
bid conforms to the invitation and will be most advantageous to the
United States.92
For formal advertising to work, there must be sufficiently precise
specifications to allow bids to be evaluated on a common basis. If the
technical requirements of the desired item or service are not adequately
defined, bidders cannot outline their proposals in sufficient detail. Major
defense research and development programs do not lend themselves to
formal advertising because they cannot be described with sufficiently
detailed specifications at the time a contractor is to be selected.93
A contractor's bid must be in strict compliance with the advertised
solicitation, including the vast body of specifications incorporated by
reference. 94 For the performance of military contracts, there is a vast
library of specifications and standards. As defense procurement has
emerged from the era of mass production, the regulations that govern the
business operations of the Defense Department and industry have grown
more sophisticated and complex.9 5 A quick and sure way to have a bid
90 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1982) provides: "Purchases of and contracts for property or
services covered by this chapter shall be made by formal advertising in all cases in which
the use of such method is feasible and practicable under the existing conditions and
circumstances."
91 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1982). For a detailed factual discussion of the submission of bids,
see Washington Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 612 F.
Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
92 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1982).
93 J. Fox, supra note 89, at 251.
9' Fairfield Scientific Corp. v. United States, 611 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
s In 1947, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) was a slim volume of
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rejected is to make it nonresponsive, i.e., to take exception to the
specifications or in some way not comply with the terms of the solicita-
tion. The main reason why procurement agents are quick to reject
nonresponsive bids is public policy: to maintain the integrity of a formal
advertising procurement process. 96 If one contractor were able to take
exception to specifications or to hedge his bid, it would be unfair for the
government to give him the award, even though the contractor offered a
better product and lower price. Other bidders would not have had the
opportunity to bid on the same terms and conditions. Other bidders,
under the modified conditions or specifications, may have been able to
offer a comparably low or lower price to the government. Therefore, the
government has adopted a firm policy that a bidder who takes exception
or qualifies his bid must be rejected, even if he is the low bidder. 97
Formal advertising for weapons contracts is judicially reviewable; even
in the face of an urgent military need, the procurement agency's failure
to comply with the regulations cannot be considered to be in accord with
law.9 s While the courts are deferential to agency action demonstrating a
rational basis, such basis "must be one based upon the exercise of reason
and judgment, which takes into consideration the circumstances and
achieves a result which whether appearing to be right or wrong, is
arrived at by a process of reasoning."99 The test is not what the court
would have done had it been in the military agency's position but
whether it can say that the action taken by the procurement officer was
not rational.100 Most courts consider such matters appropriate for judicial
review but require a strong factual showing of agency violation and
resolve doubts in favor of the agency?10 1
125 pages; a quarter century later, it consisted of several large volumes, totalling
approximately 3,000 pages. J. Fox, supra note 89, at 14.
96 Doing business with the government has become an important part of American
economic life; arbitrary deprivation of government contracts on non-discretionary grounds
is a serious wrong against which Congress may well have wished to protect when it stiffened
the bidding statutes. Indeed, Congress amended the Armed Services Procurement Act in
1955 to require that all bids and invitations to bid contain specifications which would give
prospective bidders sufficient information to permit them to bid responsibly. Congress
enacted this amendment, Act of Aug. 9, 1955, cb. 628, § 15(c), 69 Stat. 547, 551-52 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (b)), to correct the 'deplorable' situation whereby procurement agencies
had not given their notices to bid in sufficient detail, thus needlessly injuring prospective
bidders. See H.R. REP. No. 1350, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1955 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
AmoN. NEws 2713, 2722. B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 719 (2d Cir.
1983).
97 D. PACE, supra note 89, at 61.
" Robert E. Derecktor of R. I., Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 1059 (D.R.I. 1980).
9 Id. at 1065.
"o0 Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1979).
1'0 Washington Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 612 F.
Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
19871
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Negotiation is the method for selecting a contractor without formal
advertising and competition. Negotiation replaces formal advertising as
a procurement method when one or more of seventeen conditions applies.
The decision to advertise or negotiate is up to the military's broad
authority to decide when it is impracticable to competitively advertise.10 2
The determination by military officials that a weapons system should be
procured through single source negotiation is reviewable only as to the
validity and the legality of the action taken; the law demands no more
than one reasonable ground for the conclusion that advertising would be
impracticable. 0 3 Procurement through negotiation represents sixty to
eighty percent of total current military contracting, comprising almost
exclusively the production of major weapons systems. Procurement by
negotiation allows the Department of Defense to select the contractor
who seems best prepared to meet all the requirements of the program,
and to meet them on the terms most satisfactory to the government.
Under procedures for negotiation, the IFB is replaced by the Request For
Proposal (RFP). In the RFP, interested contractors must submit proposals
outlining technical and management approaches for a specific program as
well as cost estimates for the work. All offerors of proposals must be
notified of deficiencies and given a reasonable opportunity to correct their
proposals. 0 4
If negotiated procurement is chosen, proposals must be solicited from
the maximum number of qualified sources. 0 5 The choice of a contractor
is a judicially reviewable decision, but the courts "respect the wide
discretion accorded to contracting officers in their evaluation of bids and
in their application of procurement regulations."'1 6 The extent of discre-
tion exercisable by a contracting officer in processing bids is greater if the
solicitation of those bids is under a procurement by negotiation rather
than by formal advertising; furthermore, the absolute requirement of
responsiveness is not applicable to negotiated procurement.10 7 However,
such discretion is inappropriate where it is demonstrated that the
military's position is contrary to established practice. 0 8 Thus, if the
totality of the circumstances involved demonstrates that the decision of
the contracting officer violates established policy -such as to maximize
competitiveness in procurement-judicial review is appropriate.10 9
102 Self-Powered Lighting, Ltd. v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
103 Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 452 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1978).
104 DAR 3-805.3.
105 See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1982).
106 Saco Defense Sys. Div. v. Weinberger, 806 F.2d 308, 313 (1st Cir. 1986), (quoting
Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1272 (5th Cir. 1978)).
10' DeMat Air, Inc. v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 197 (1983) (citing DAR 3-805.5). See also
NOA Airscrew Howden v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 622 F. Supp. 984 (D. Mich. 1985).
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Pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978,110 all contract claims by
a contractor against the government must be submitted to the contract-
ing officer for decision."' A contractor may appeal the contracting
officer's decision to an agency board of contract appeals within ninety
days from the date of receipt of a contracting officer's decision. The
decision of an agency board of contract appeals is final except for appeal
to the the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 1 2 In lieu of appealing the
decision of the contracting officer to the appropriate agency board, a
contractor may bring an action directly on the claim in the United States
Court of Claims. Thus, where a contractor claims that the military has
failed to comply with the procurement laws in awarding negotiated
contracts, those claims may be addressed to the United States Claims
Court or the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.113 Alternatively,
if the disappointed bidder can demonstrate that the challenged agency
action has caused him injury in fact and that such injury was to an
interest 'arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated
by the statute,' then the bidder may have standing under section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act 1 4 and the Armed Services Procurement
Act," 5 if the claim is not based on any express or implied contract."
16
2. Design or Performance Specifications
The distinction between advertised and negotiated contracts is espe-
cially significant to the military contractor defense: contracts involving
an explicit government-mandated design specification leaving only
actual construction to the contractor tend to be formally advertised.
Design specifications have been characterized as including "precise
measurements, tolerances, materials, in-process and finished product
tests, quality control and inspection requirements, and other informa-
tion."" 7 The government may be liable for any errors, omissions, and
deficiencies in design specifications, predicated upon an implied war-
ranty of suitability."" Thus, design specifications may impute a war-
ranty that if the specifications are complied with they will produce an
110 Act of Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1982)).
"' Id. at § 605(a).
112 Id. at § 607. See Teller Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 802 F.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
13 Rex Sys., Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 149 (a)(3)
and 41 U.S.C. § 607(d)).
114 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
lir 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
116 See B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983); Choctaw Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609 (11th Cir. 1985).
117 Appeal of Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) § 3492 (Sept. 11, 1962).
118 Appeal of Blount Bros. Constr. Co., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) § 3300 (Jan. 31, 1962).
1987]
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
acceptable result. 119 However, not even a design contract entitles a con-
tractor to rely solely on the drawings and specifications provided nor does
the labelling of a contract as containing design specifications remove a
contractor's obligations for the extent of work to be accomplished.' 20
Where the contractor should have known that the prepared specifications
could not produce the desired result, he cannot successfully claim that the
government is liable for additional compensation.12 '
By contrast, negotiated contracts tend to entail performance specifica-
tions merely indicating what characteristics the government requires in
the item. "Where an item is purchased by a performance specification, the
contractor accepts general responsibility for design, engineering, and
achievement of stated performance requirements."'122 Negotiated con-
tracts containing only performance specifications leave design of the
weapon system to the expertise and discretion of the manufacturer. "[I]n
a performance contract, the contractor must assume responsibility for the
means and methods selected to achieve the end result." 23 Where the
contractor's product fails to meet performance specifications, the govern-
ment faces no contractual liability even if it did not disclose the novelty
of the item or if the contractor's difficulties were unanticipated.124 The
point here is that a deliberate policy choice has been made by the nation's
senior military officials to award contracts for major weapons programs
entailing significant design tasks through negotiation because the gov-
ernment wants to evaluate contractors' technical capabilities, technical
approaches, and management ability, as well as costs. It is significant
that these contracts for major weapons systems entail only general
performance specifications. Consider the recent testimony of Deputy
Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV:
The quality and productivity of a weapons system is enhanced
when we focus our efforts on its critical requirements. In the past,
our requests for proposals contained thousands of detailed mili-
tary specifications. These specifications prescribed how contrac-
tors were to accomplish specific tasks, allowing little flexibility
for contractors to assess and recommend those requirements
which were cost effective and truly needed. Under our new
"streamlining" initiative, we are telling contractors what is
required rather than how to accomplish it.125
11$ Dewey Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 650, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1986); LaCrosse
Garment Mfg. Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1377 (Ct. CI. 1970).
120 Zinger Const. Co., Inc. v. United States, 807 F.2d 979 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
12 L. W. Foster Sportswear Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1969):
222 Appeal of Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) § 3492 (Sept. 11, 1962).
'2 Penguin Indus., Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 934, 937 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
124 Jet Constr. Co. v. United States, 531 F.2d 538 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
1"5 Defense Acquisition Process, Policies, and Structure: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
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This point is critical to the military contractor defense. The procure-
ment system has institutionalized the fundamental difference between
the acquisition of relatively fungible commodities as to which it can
specify design requirements from the acquisition of sophisticated weap-
ons systems as to which it intentionally assigns design responsibility to
the manufacturer. It would seem eminently reasonable for the judiciary to
maintain faith by ruling that a contractor charged with defectively
designing a product may claim the contract specification defense when it
proves that it complied with the military's design specifications set
forward in an advertised contract competitively bid. Accordingly, where
the procurement system has assigned design responsibility to the man-
ufacturer by use of a negotiated contract containing only performance
specifications, it might be reasonable for the judiciary to rule that the
contractor independently assumed responsibility for the design of the
weapon and that the burden of proof as to fault for a defect lies
exclusively with the contractor.
B. Production of Major Weapons Systems
In many of the cases raising the military contractor defense, the defect
in a design which caused the accident was incorporated into the weapon
after the contract was signed--changes were made as production pro-
ceeded. Obviously, by this stage of the procurement process, the contrac-
tor is engaged in attempting to satisfy the government's specifications.
Oftentimes, that effort will result in compromises and changes of some
specifications. Because the relationship between the contractor and the
military during the production stage can be cooperative, the McKay court
believed that the judiciary can not and should not encourage "fixing the
locus of responsibility for military equipment design with more precision
than is possible."' 26 The purpose of this section is to assert the contrary
position that precisely fixing the locus of responsibility for military
equipment design is not only possible but is routinely accomplished by
the judiciary.
The military relies on private contractors to take advantage of the
superior efficiency and expertise of the private sector especially after
source selection, and therefore provides methods by which changes may
be introduced as necessary. Critically, the promotion of entrepreneurial
initiative is balanced by the effort to determine accountability for
weapons design. This section examines the issue of accountability for
design changes during the production phase by discussing: (1) the reasons
for design changes as identified in subsequent litigation; and (2) propos-
Procurement and Military, Nuclear Systems of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1579-80 (1985) (statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft).
126 McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,'704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983).
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als to allocate responsibility in advance by congressionally mandated
warranties or indemnification.
That major weapons systems incorporate design specifications estab-
lished during the production phase does not blur the allocation of
responsibility. On the contrary, the responsibility for the decision to
incorporate design changes is often fixed with precision, and those
determinations are unquestionably a matter for judicial review. Once
again, McKay suggests a confused and entangled meshing of military and
contractor interests which the judiciary cannot unravel without intrud-
ing on the military's policy prerogatives. However, by the time that the
contract has been signed for the production of a major weapon system, the
policy questions implicating the judgment of the military have typically
reached a point of finality; the question is how best to accomplish the
assigned tasks. The answers to that question do not invariably come from
contractors or from the military, but they inevitably come through a
traceable record which may be judicially reviewed without significant
implication for national security policy.
1. The Dynamics of Weapons Production
The underlying idea of designing a weapon system is to meet an enemy
threat that will prevail five to seven or more years from now. There is an
implicit uncertainty as to how that will be accomplished which is
reflected in the fact that a major weapons program can experience
contract changes at a rate of 2,000 per year. 2 7 Unforeseen pitfalls and
opportunities arise during the production phase which cause the need for
a design change. Each of these changes is reflected in a "Supplemental
Agreement" which is negotiated much like the original contract was.128
This is a formal document embodying strict concern for accountability.
The sources for design changes during production vary. No doubt many
changes represent the unilateral action by a government authority
compelling the contractor to perform according to a new or altered
requirement. Such changes may have been initially suggested by the
government in response to new developments of military policy or
technology. Many contracts for major weapons systems contain a changes
clause which vests in the contracting officer discretion to make changes
within the scope of the contract. An order change determined to be
outside the scope of the contract is an abuse of the contract right and is
a cardinal change for which the government may be held liable.129
Most often it is the contractor who suggests the design change. One
reason may be that the production of the weapon as originally contracted
"I J. Fox, supra note 89, at 359.
128 Id.
129 General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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may be proving more difficult or expensive than planned. The main goal
of a weapons development program is to resolve engineering problems, a
process that by its very nature generates change. It is during the course
of a development program that contractors begin to do the work they
outlined in response to the government's RFP. As a contractor transforms
its paper designs into actual hardware, the contractor may contend that
certain approaches will not work. When this happens, the contractor
must submit an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) describing an
alternative approach. When a dispute arises, the contractor is required to
proceed diligently in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision,
but may later claim compensation if it can prove losses resulting from a
defect in the government's design specifications. 130 This claim is typical
of any commercial claim of impossibility and, accordingly, is an issue of
law reviewable by the courts.131
Structural deficiencies in the procurement system can also result in
design changes in ways arguably adverse to the nation's interest. 132 Per-
haps system capabilities that were considered desirable at the time the
initial program was planned and contracted were omitted from the orig-
inal contract because the related costs might have prevented the program
from receiving requisite military approval. In such event, the features
deleted at the time of initial approval may be re-introduced during the
production phase when the likelihood of approval is greater. Alterna-
tively, it has been often claimed in recent years that some changes are
added which are not cost justifiable. The extent of such "goldplating"--as
contrasted to "worthwhile improvement"-depends to a great extent on
who is making the cost/benefit evaluation. Yet the possibility of
goldplating underlines the fact that fallible program managers, not nec-
essarily supreme military commanders, originate and justify ideas for
changes. At minimum, any contract change is likely to increase profits for
the contractor because no matter how competitive was the initial pro-
curement, a contractor is inevitably in a sole source position when nego-
I" S.W. Elecs. & Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1078 (Ct. Cl. 19B1).
... Koppers Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 554 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
132 For its part, the military authority will often want the product even if it cannot meet
all the original specifications. Within reasonable limits, the military would rather accept a
weapon that almost meets original specifications than no new weapon at all. DOD program
managers may lack both the capability and desire to make many of the decisions regarding
the design of weaponry. Military personnel in program offices are rapidly rotated from one
type of assignment to another which tends to deprive them of the understanding of a project
equal to the sophistication of the private contractors. Furthermore, there is little incentive
provided to Pentagon managers to take real control over the production process. Many
young officers believe that procurement assignments will not advance their careers.
Procurement positions may lack status because there are no uniform standards by which to
evaluate the effectiveness of program managers. See R. Srum, Tma DFNsE GsAm ch. 10
(1986).
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tiating contract changes. 133 The longer the time period between a con-
tractor's proposed change and the military's final approval, the greater the
likelihood that the contractor will have already spent significant sums on
the new work. When the product is finally delivered, it may be difficult for
military officials to prove that changes already incurred should have been
pursued differently. It is often easier and more efficient to take the change
offered by the contractor (usually with substantial documentation and
support) in reliance on that contractor's expertise.
The point here is not to criticize the current procurement process but to
acknowledge the obvious: that changes in the design of a weapon can
result from numerous causes, many of which are, in fact, the responsi-
bility of the contractor. To presume as a matter of law that the design of
a weapon is inevitably the product of a policy decision made by military
authorities begs reality unnecessarily. On a case by case basis, that
responsibility could lie with either the government or the contractor.
A refined system for adjudicating disputes and allocating responsibility
has been established therefore which relies on the judiciary to enforce
accountability under the law. To suggest that the determination of who is
legally responsible for a design defect in a weapon is too complex for the
courts unnecessarily and incorrectly belittles the ability of the many
panels which cope with these same issues in a variety of analogous legal
contexts. The courts can and do hold weapons makers accountable for
their products. The suggestion that weapons procurement is not account-
able because of the identity of interests of both the military and private
contractors is simply contradicted by the vast body of procurement law
and litigation.
Consider the role of the judiciary in allocating the responsibility for
design changes in Ordnance Research v. United States.134 Plaintiff
claimed recovery for increased costs resulting from what it termed the
government's defective specifications under a Navy contract for produc-
tion of igniters used in fire bombs. Six explosions occurred during
production resulting in delay and increased costs as well as loss of life.
The question was whether the government or the plaintiff contractor was
responsible for the accident. Plaintiff established that the advertised
contract contained elaborate design specifications and claimed that upon
deviating from the specification calling for "wet blending" the explosions
ceased. The military claimed that its specifications were not defective and
that plaintiff violated its obligation to follow the specifications by
changing to "dry blending" without formally notifying responsible offi-
cials. Thereupon followed a lengthy inquiry by the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals which held in favor of the military. This holding was
reversed by the trial judge who found that the Board's decision that the
13 See D. PACE, supra note 89, at 181-93.
13 609 F.2d 462 (Ct. C1. 1979).
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two blending processes were equally safe was arbitrary and capricious.
The Court of Claims affirmed the trial judge's determination that the
precautions prescribed in the Navy's specifications were inadequate to
prevent some explosions and were, therefore, the legal cause of the
explosions. Accordingly, the military was held liable for the losses.
The importance of Ordnance Research is not its outcome but rather that
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the trial judge, and the
Court of Claims each engaged in a detailed inquiry as to which party was
responsible for which specifications leading to which accidents. In this
case, the courts assumed their obligation to adjudicate a dispute with
proper respect for the military as a fellow institution of the national
government. Simply enough, a court of law ruled after substantial factual
inquiry that in this case the military was responsible for the design
specification which caused the accident, and liability for injuries and
losses necessarily followed. This case did not raise any concerns about the
necessity to protect the military establishment from judicial scrutiny. It
must be stressed that such disputes, which inquire into the respective
rights and obligations of the military and its contractors, necessarily come
before the courts, and the courts seem to be competent at resolving them.
While no court has seriously asserted that it would have the authority
to judge decisions made in pursuit of national security, neither has any
court been deterred from resolving commercial disputes by that hypo-
thetical concern. As stated earlier, the question here is not strictly
whether the judiciary may second-guess military decisions, but rather
when the judiciary should recognize that a military decision which
compels judicial deference has in fact been made. Contrary to the
decisions of McKay and its progeny, the courts routinely make such
determinations apparently without significant complexity or jeopardy to
national security. Judicial respect for the province of military policy-
making is and should be considerable; but no immunity is so wide that it
should be applied unquestioningly.
2. Design Warranties and Indemnification
The issue of accountability for weapons design has been recently and
explicitly addressed by Congress, and many of the questions raised by the
military contractor defense have been debated and resolved legislatively.
In 1984, Congress passed section 794 of the Department of Defense Ap-
propriations Act, FY 1984, which provides that contractors for a weapon
system must guarantee in writing that the system and its components
were (1) designed and manufactured to conform to the government's
performance standards and (2) free from all defects. 135 In the event of a
135 See Warranties: Consideration of Section 794 of the Department of Defense Appropri-
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failure of that weapons system, the contractor must bear the cost of prompt
repair or replacement or reimburse the United States for such costs. The
statute provides that the Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement
of a written guarantee where such waiver is necessary in the interest of
the national defense or where it would not be cost-effective if he properly
notifies Congress.36
'The principal purposes of a warranty in a government contract are to
delineate the rights and obligations of the contractor and the govern-
ment for defective items and services and to foster quality perfor-
mance." 3 7 The purpose of section 794 is to insure that the defense
department purchases weapons systems which work in the way they are
intended at the time they are needed.'38 Underlying the congressional
requirement was the belief that such warranties are appropriate where a
contractor had substantial design responsibility. The possibility that a
contractor had limited responsibility in the design of a weapon such that
the imposition of a warranty requirement would be inequitable was
considered, and congressional conferees agreed that in such event the
Department of Defense could narrow the scope of the warranty.1 39
Many of the policy issues raised regarding warranties are identical to
issues raised by the military contractor defense as was demonstrated by
testimony of contractors at hearings subsequent to passage of section
794. Representatives of contractors argued that adherence to section 794
would increase the cost of national defense, would deter contractors from
offering innovative approaches to defense needs, and would represent an
unprecedented expansion of post-acceptance contingent liabilities facing
all tiers of contractors. 140 Still others testified as to the unfairness of
holding a contractor responsible for a weapons system design that was
developed or at least approved by the government and was within the
ations Act for Fiscal Year 1984: Joint Hearing before the Subcomm. on Procurement and
Military Nuclear Systems and the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. iv (1985) [hereinafter House Warranties Hearings].
1.6 Id. at 1. (statement of Rep. Stratton, Chairman, Procurement and Military Nuclear
Systems Subcomm.).
137 Armed Services Procurement Regulation 1-324. See generally, Warranties on Weap-
ons Systems: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32
(1984) [hereinafter Senate Warranties Hearings].
138 Id. at 32-33. (statement of Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering). Under Secretary DeLauer also noted that the use of warranties
is not new to the Department of Defense: 'Their use goes back at least two decades;
warranties were used on an independent basis by individual services for many years prior
to 1964."
"I Statement of Managers in H.R. 5167 Conference Report, Congressional Record H
10304, Sept. 26, 1984.
14' Senate Warranties Hearings 84-87 (statement of James R. Lincicome, Executive Vice
President Motorola Inc., on Behalf of the Electronic Industries Association).
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government's complete control with respect to technical details. 14 1 Addi-
tional concerns were raised concerning the potential hazards for the
defense industrial base in the event that warranties were required, and
that the results of such requirements would be protracted and damaging
litigation which would further impede the weapons production process as
well as raise its costs. The prevailing congressional response to these
arguments was succinctly stated by Congressman Levine:
Warranties do cost money; ... but the Pentagon's current
build-now-test-later policy is costing taxpayers billions of dollars
and is bankrupting our defense budget. Isn't it better to make
sure that an expensive weapon works correctly from the begin-
ning rather than cost the taxpayers enormous sums of money for
repairs and spare parts to make the weapon work the way it was
supposed to in the first place?142
Warranties for the design of major equipment are common in the
commercial marketplace despite the opposition of those manufacturers to
which warranties may apply. Not surprisingly, their introduction into
military contracting was not warmly received by weapons makers. Some
observers believe that weapons makers have successfully evaded the
spirit if not the letter of the law.143 The point here is not to weigh the
merits of warranties but simply to acknowledge that the warranty
requirement is law.144 Congress, with the constitutional authority to
raise and equip armies, obviously did not consider these purported
consequences for procurement to be sufficiently serious such that respon-
sibility for design defects should not be assigned, by law, to weapons
contractors. Warranties are a recognized means to hold producers of
goods accountable to the users of those goods for losses resulting from
defective design or workmanship. To require them of military contrac-
tors, despite the objections of those contractors, signifies a profound
congressional commitment to subject military procurement to the laws of
the commercial marketplace. Ironically, having lost in Congress, the
objections to accountability have been accorded a more sympathetic
judicial reception. It must be asked by what authority the judiciary may
enact policies regarding weapons procurement which Congress has
chosen to reject.
141 Id. at 140-43. (statement of Machinery & Allied Products Institute).
142 House Warranties Hearings at 5.
"" See Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 415-420 (1983)
(statement of Senator Andrews).
144 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1984, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1983),
which provided for weapon system guarantees, was repealed and replaced by 10 U.S.C.
§ 2403 (Supp. 1987).
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Closely related to the issue of warranties has been the issue of
indemnification. Stressing that liability for product defects raises the
costs of weapons and interferes with the development of high technology
equipment, military contractors have long sought government indemni-
fication for tort liability arising from defective products. Under current
law, the United States is liable for indemnification in tort to the same
extent that it is liable directly in tort under the Federal Tort Claims
Act-i.e. when one of its employees was at fault. Indemnification is
appropriate only in limited and carefully considered situations. 145 How-
ever, the enormous growth in the size of product liability awards has
elicited proposed legislation that the government essentially insure
contractors from having to pay such awards. These proposals have not
been successful due in great part to the Administration's position that
government indemnification would invite greater government control
over the design and manufacturing practices of contractors:
In the commercial world, risks of third party liability are
covered by insurance or are assumed by the manufacturer. In
defense contracting, we believe this should also be the case except
for exceptional circumstances involving unusually hazardous or
nuclear risks which DoD does indemnify. We are concerned that
blanket indemnification may reduce the contractors' incentive to
assume responsibility for the performance of their products by
shifting part or all of the liability onto the government. We prefer
to contract in an environment similar to the commercial market-
place where companies must take all the steps that would be
required by a prudent businessman in order to ensure the safety
of the company's product.146
The imposition of warranties and the denial of indemnification are
compelling evidence that Congress has chosen not to protect military
contractors from product liability for defective design and manufacturing
typical of civilian production. The preference for contracting in an
environment similar to the commercial marketplace, where accountabil-
ity under law stands unquestioned, is powerful evidence that the argu-
ments advanced in favor of the military contractor defense are contrary
to established procurement policy. The implications for resolution of the
military contractor defense are clear because of the shared concern with
who will be held accountable for injuries caused by design defects.
145 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (dealing with indemnification provisions of a contract of a
military department for research and development); Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210;
50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435.
146 Indemnification of Government Contractors: Hearings before the Senate Comm.on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1986) (statement of Mary Ann Gilleece, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Management).
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Weapons contractors, by opposing efforts to require warranties and by
advocating government indemnification, have sought to avoid legal
responsibility for design defects on the grounds that the onus of respon-
sibility would be too expensive and would interfere with the nation's
attainment of the strongest defense. As to each of these issues, Congress
has repeatedly and forcefully rejected the contractors' position in favor of
increased accountability. Ironically, it has been the courts, in the name of
judicial deference and separation of powers, which have been far more
receptive to policy arguments regarding the costs of accountability and
the needs of national security than has Congress. In this sense, the
judicially-developed military contractor defense is a striking departure
from procurement policy as developed by the institutions (Congress and
the military) which are constitutionally vested with the authority to
determine matters of national security.
C. Litigation re Weapons Production
At least since the formation of the modem military establishment in
1947, there has been no litigation which has seriously challenged the
process by which military needs are identified and translated into
weapons requirements. No court has seriously considered that high
military officers in the Pentagon should be subject to civil tort liability for
their decisions, nor are the policies emanating from the Pentagon matter
for judicial review absent specific congressional authorization. However,
it should be noted that there exists no absolute immunity for non-
military executive officers carrying out tasks essential to national
security. 147 Even military officials performing military decisionmaking
are entitled only to a qualified immunity for the consequences of the
lawful decision to take military action.148
1. Litigation Involving Competition Among Weapons Makers 149
Congress has long sought to hold private commercial conduct subject to
judicial enforcement of private commercial law and has encouraged
weapons acquisition through competition. 50 The Competition In Con-
147 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985).
148 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
149 An inexhaustive list of recent decisions includes: Williams v. Curtiss.Wright Corp.,
694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Sage
Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981); General Aircraft Corp.
v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United
Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
"ao The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 41 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1980),
established "the policy of Congress to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the
procurement of property and services." The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 10
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tracting Act requires that a procurement agency maximize the use of full
and open competition in procuring goods and services. The Act created
bid protest systems within the GAO and the GSA Board of Contract
Appeals to resolve charges of illegal conduct on the part of procuring
agencies. Vendors who believe they have been injured by abusive
contracting practices may challenge the government and other vendors
through these proceedings. 5 1 The bid protest procedures are intended to
inform Congress of the operation of existing procurement laws, and to use
the pressure of publicity to enforce compliance with those laws. Most
important, these procedures enable disappointed bidders to compel the
executive to explain some of its procurement decisions. Barring exigent
circumstances, once a bid protest has been filed, a contract cannot be
executed until the protest has been resolved by the issuance of the
Comptroller General's recommendation. 5 2
These bid protest procedures were constitutionally challenged in
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.15 3 Plaintiff, a
disappointed bidder, filed a bid protest, but the Army proceeded with
execution of the contract because it believed the stay provisions uncon-
stitutional. Since the Comptroller General is a member of the legislative
branch,15 4 the Army claimed that the Act empowered him to interfere
excessively in the execution of procurement laws. In rejecting that
argument, the Third Circuit reflected an appreciation of the distribution
of governmental authority among the branches of government as regards
procurement:
Rather than concentrating power in the legislative branch,
CICA diffuses and divides power, giving final control over pro-
curement decisions to the executive but permitting meaningful
oversight by an agent of Congress. Like other political mecha-
nisms built on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers,
CICA encourages the branches to work together without enabling
either branch to bind or compel the other. That is the way a
government of divided and separated powers is supposed to
work. 155
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2316 (1982) similarly emphasizes efficient acquisition by the Department of
Defense. See generally HousE CoiM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H. R. REP. No. 97-71
accompanying H.R. 3519 (subsequently passed as the DEPAr OF DssENSE AUTrozAroN
AcT OF 1982, Pub. L. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1099 (1982)).
161 See Efforts by Federal Agencies to Circumvent the Competition in Contracting Act:
Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).1s2 31 U.S.C. § 3553 (c), (d) (supp. 1984).
153 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986).
"' Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
155 809 F.2d 979, 998.
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The policies embodied in CICA and the decision in Ameron reflect a
consistent willingness to separate the military as buyer from the weapons
maker as seller and to treat their contracts as commercial transactions
rather than as political decisions. All of this strongly suggests that this
nation has chosen a competitive market process for procuring weapons
with no special legal immunities other than those explicitly granted by
Congress.
Many disputes among military contractors involve claims that one
contractor culpably excluded another contractor from a weapons procure-
ment market. These disputes necessarily implicate the military's decision
to engage one contractor rather than the other-an issue analogously
sensitive to the military as the decision to approve a defective weapons
design. While the courts have been urged to immunize conduct under-
taken in the pursuit of weapons procurement contracts on grounds
similar to those supporting the military contractor defense, such argu-
ments have never been successful.
In Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,156 plaintiff claimed that
defendant was liable for breach of contract and attempt to monopolize,
but the district court dismissed plaintiffs claims because they "called into
question the government's unfettered right to designate the who, what,
when and where of weapons system production; injunctive relief would
'necessarily limit the United States Government in its F-18 procurement
activities' and relief would impinge on the government's conduct of
foreign relations."15 7 Reversing, the Ninth Circuit definitively addressed
the propriety of an immunity for weapons makers from civil tort liability:
Northrop does not challenge the wisdom or legality of any
governmental act or decision. Instead, it seeks to restrain and
recover damages from McDonnell for the latter's allegedly im-
proper tactics in marketing F-18's. The challenged activity by
McDonnell was neither authorized nor directed by any branch of
Government. The mere fact that the challenged conduct occurred
in a regulated industry does not alone alter its private commer-
cial character. The issues presented for trial are not political
questions-they are legal issues, involving private commercial
activity which the judiciary is uniquely equipped to resolve. 58
2. The Military Secrets Privilege
In the scant tort litigation involving challenges to military decisions
generally, the courts have focused on the narrow issue of an evidentiary
1"6 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983).
1- Id. at 1042.
,r1 Id. at 1047.
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privilege rather than a broad immunity derived from separation of
powers doctrine and accordingly have, when necessary, granted to the
military a privilege regarding the release of sensitive information. The
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Reynolds,159 established that secrets of state--
matters the revelation of which reasonably could be seen as a threat to
the nation-are absolutely privileged from disclosure in the courts. The
important aspects of the military secrets privilege for purposes of this
discussion are its rigorous limitations. The Court in Reynolds denied
disclosure of an Air Force report of an accident to widows of servicemen
because of the reasonable possibility that military secrets were involved.
While the Court recognized the need to safeguard national security from
improper disclosure, the Court upheld the authority of the judiciary to
determine, on a case by case basis, whether a claim of privilege should be
accepted. The significant limitations of this privilege were clearly de-
scribed:
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted
by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It
is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control
over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that
officer. The court itself must determine whether the circum-
stances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.160
This privilege to protect the military from judicial scrutiny which
might threaten national security has been applied in product liability
litigation against weapons manufacturers. In Machin v. Zuckert,161 the
D.C. Circuit Court upheld the Secretary of the Air Force's claim of
privilege against disclosure of reports concerning an aircraft accident
only to the extent that the Secretary could show that disclosure would
"impair the national security by weakening a branch of the military,"
including "any portions of the report which reflect Air Force deliberations
or recommendations as to policies that should be pursued."162
The point here is that concern that the judiciary will overstep proper
boundaries by scrutinizing a military judgment is well-meaning but
generally inapplicable to the problem of the military contractor defense.
The design of a weapon follows analytically and chronologically far after
219 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
160 Id. at 7-8. See also Halkin v. Helms, 690 F. 2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See generally,
Note, The Military and State Secrete Privilege: Protection for the National Security or
Immunity for the Executive, 91 Yale L. J. 570 (1982).
161 316 F.2d 336 (D.C.Cir. 1963).
162 Id. at 339.
[Vol. 35:351
50https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss3/4
LIABILITY OF WEAPONS MAKERS
the fashioning of weapons policy-judicial inquiries into the responsibil-
ity for a defective design need not force the courts to trespass into the
military sphere. The claim by the courts in McKay that contractors and
the military work intimately in making decisions providing for common
survival and defense suggests an impropriety which may or may not exist
but in any event should not, in a nation governed by law, be promoted.
On the hypothetical assumption that a serviceman's product liability
suit against a weapons manufacturer challenges the military's identifi-
cation of a weapons requirement, the courts can invoke the military
secrets privilege to protect legitimate national security interests. The
military secrets privilege is a more sharply refined legal doctrine than a
blanket refusal to hear cases which might implicate a procurement
decision. The requirements of the privilege-a formal claim made by the
department head after personal consideration-suggest the type of judi-
cial effort to balance potentially conflicting interests on a selective basis
which obviates the need for McKay's broader immunity and which
recognizes that judicial protection should be afforded only to the govern-
ment, not private parties.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1945, the United States gained the ability to expunge any threat,
indeed any nation. The difficulties of reconciling this power with our
constitutional commitment to rule by law were complicated when our
chief adversary matched our ability. In the face of that threat, some have
argued that this nation's adherence to the rule of law may weaken the
execution of military policy and jeopardize this nation's security: that
since our adversary is not restricted by our law, we should become more
like our adversary to save ourselves. The response offered here is that
there is no fundamental contradiction between the need for security in a
dangerous world and the rule of law.
A thorough review of the weapons acquisition system developed by
Congress demonstrates a repeated effort to enhance accountability and to
promote typical market conditions. This vast system may not be as
successful as it should be. Arguably, the expenditure of hundreds of
billions of dollars in relative secrecy creates opportunities for weapons
manufacturers which are difficult to control. Perhaps more reforms are
needed. No serious commentator, however, has suggested that the
military/industrial complex should be more invidious--that as a matter
of declared national policy we should encourage military contractors to
decide, in secret and without review, what are the tolerable risks of
weapons.
The military contractor defense is a recent judicial invention motivated
by serious concerns for the impacts of product liability judgments on the
national defense establishment. With respect, however, those concerns
are perhaps best left to Congress. The judiciary should treat all private
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parties equally; if immunities are to be granted to military contractors,
Congress should be the grantor. The judiciary's role is nevertheless
extremely significant for it is the judiciary which must repeatedly define
the line of demarcation separating the determination of military policy
by proper authorities from the production of weapons by private industry.
The ability of the courts to assess responsibility for defective weapons on
a case by case basis is an important and powerful tool toward an efficient
weapons procurement system. The Supreme Court should reverse McKay
and require the lower courts to perform this legal function to the best of
their ability.
The military contractor defense should be declared a nullity. As a
matter of product liability law, if any contractor can show that it
precisely followed the explicit specifications of the government and that
it was those specifications which caused the injury, then the contract
specification defense might appropriately be invoked. However, any
defense based on the uniqueness of weapons contractors embues these
entrepreneurs with a privileged status to which they are not entitled.
Only if the cause of the accident was the military's responsibility in
dictating the specific design found to have caused the loss should product
liability to any injured party (including servicemen) be negated; the
burden of proof must, of course, be on the defendant to establish that the
cause of the accident was, in fact, the military's responsibility.
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